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̔ʹΟθεν καὶ τὸ ̓Ιεσοῦϛ σωτὲρ ἑρµηνεύεται. . . . Χρίσιϛ δὲ ἡ 
θεότηϛ τῆϛ ἀνθροπότητοϛ.    —  John  of  Damascus  
 
Per   speculum   in   aenigmate,   dit   saint   Paul.   Nous   voyons  
toutes   choses   à   l’envers.   Quand   nous   croyons   donner,  
nous  recevons,  etc.    —  Léon  Bloy  
 
  
To  borrow   a  phrase   from  a  member   of   the   opposition,  Christianity   introduced  
“new  modes  and  orders”  to  our  understanding  of  reality.  And  no  one  was  more  alive  to  
these  changes   that  Augustine  of  Hippo.  His  works  display  an  alert   sensitivity   to  how  
our  understanding  of  God,  human  nature,   history,  morality,   and   so  on   are   expanded  
and   deepened   by   the   becoming-­‐‑flesh   of  God’s  Word.   Indeed,   communicating   a   new,  
“Christianized”   understanding   of   reality   is   at   the   heart   of   Augustine’s   project   in  De  
doctrina   Christiana,   and   it   leads,   as   one   should   expect,   to   a   modification   of   liberal  
education,  i.e.,  that  education  which  develops  us  intellectually  and  morally  so  as  to  live  
in  freedom,  from  sin  and  toward  God,  as  much  as  we  are  able  in  this  fallen  world.  
   Now,   I   choose   this   word   “modification”   deliberately.   For   Augustine   does   not  
think   that   the   coming   of   the   Christ   dissolved   the   very   “substance”   or   “nature”   of  
education   as   pagans   before   the   Incarnation   experienced   it;   instead,   he   thinks   that   a  
Christian   should  undertake   liberal   education   in   accordance  with   a  new  modus,   a  new  
“mode”  or  “measure,”  that  derives  from  intellectual  assent  to  the  reality  of  the  Christ,  
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the   Anointed   One,   and   that   orients   it   rightly   toward   the   true   completion   of   human  
nature.  Outlining  the  essential   facets  of  such  Christianized  liberal  education  inasmuch  
as  they  can  be  drawn  from  Augustine’s  De  doctrina1  is  the  primary  goal  of  this  paper.  
   There  are  a   few  steps  toward  achieving  this  goal.  First,   I  show  in  what  way  De  
doctrina  actually  concerns  liberal  education,  or  at  least  includes  it  within  its  scope,  which  
is   the   aim   of   section   I.   Although   I   don’t   consider   this   is   a   contentious   point,   it   still  
requires  an  explanation,  because  at  first  glance  De  doctrina  may  appear  to  be  concerned  
primarily   and   even   solely  with   the   interpretation   of   Scripture—which   seems   to   be   a  
narrower  topic  than  liberal  education.  Second,  I  articulate  the  new  modus  of  education,  
its   new   “mode”   or   “measure,”   presented   in   De   doctrina.   How   exactly   is   education  
“modified”   by   Augustine?   I   address   this   question   in   section   II   by   honing   in   on  
Augustine’s   reflections  on   res,   “realities,”   in   the  early   chapters  of  Book   I.  For   in   these  
reflections  Augustine  deftly  shows  how  we  are  to  rethink  the  realities  we  encounter  in  
accordance  with  “new  modes  and  orders”  brought  to   light  by  the  coming  of  the  God-­‐‑
man,  i.e.,  by  the  becoming-­‐‑flesh  of  Wisdom  itself.  Recognition  of  these  new  modes  and  
orders   not   only   affects   us   “ontologically,”   i.e.,   in   the   task   of   adjusting   ourselves  
intellectually   and   volitionally   to   the   realities   we   encounter;   but   it   also   aids   us  
hermeneutically  (i.e.,  in  the  task  of  interpreting  Scripture)  and  pedagogically  (i.e.,  in  the  
task  of  educating  human  souls).  And,   indeed,  all   three  of  these  concerns—ontological,  
hermeneutical,   and   pedagogical—are   on   Augustine’s   radar   in   De   doctrina.   After  
detailing  Augustine’s  reflections  early  in  Book  I,  therefore,  I  suggest  way  in  which  how  
the   task   of   education  may   be  modified   in   accordance  with  Augustine’s  Christianized  
ontology.  Third,  in  section  III,  I  attempt  to  exemplify  the  modification  of  education  by  
briefly   considering   Augustine’s   treatment   of   rhetoric   in   Book   IV.   Augustine  
                                                
1  For  the  sake  of  brevity,  I  refer  to  De  doctrina  Christiana  simply  as  “De  doctrina”  (even  though  the  
“Christiana”   in   the   title   is   crucial!).   In   the  notes,   I   cite  De  doctrina  Christiana   as   “DDC”  and  provide   the  
book,  chapter,  and  paragraph  numbers.  
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“Christianizes”  the  learning  and  exercise  of  the  rhetorical  art,  and  from  this  we  are  able  
to  extrapolate  a  few  of  the  principles  at  work  in  the  “Christianization”  of  education  as  a  
whole.  Fourth  and  finally,  I  conclude  with  a  few  very  general  remarks  that  attempt  to  
situate   the   sort   of   education   of   which   Augustine   speaks   in  De   doctrina   among   some  
current   alternatives   with   which   we   are   familiar.   My   hope   throughout   is   that   by  
reflecting   on   Augustine’s   modification   of   liberal   education   in  De   doctrina,   the   reader  
may   come   to   a   deeper   and   more   expansive   understanding   of   how   to   exercise   more  
effectively   his   or   her   own   activity   of   doctrina,   particularly   at   Christian   institutions  
dedicated  to  liberal  education.  
  
I.  What  De  doctrina  Is  About  
   Clearly   the  De   doctrina   is   about   interpreting   Scripture.   This   is   evident   from   its  
opening   words.   “There   are   certain   precepts   for   treating   the   Scriptures,”   Augustine  
begins,   “that   I   see  as  able   to  be  handed  on  not  unfittingly   to   those  who  are  eager   for  
them,   so   that   they  may  profit  not  only  by   reading  others  who  have  uncovered   things  
that   are   covered   over   in   the   divine   Letters,   but   also   by   uncovering   such   things  
themselves  for  others.”2  Upon  reading  this  opening  sentence,  we  may  expect  a  rulebook  
for  interpreting  the  Bible,  and  in  some  sense  De  doctrina  offers  this.  Yet  its  title  bespeaks  
a   larger   concern;   for,   as   many   have   noted,   the   phrase   doctrina   Christiana   potentially  
refers  to  a  wide  array  of  topics.3  It  could  refer  to  the  content  of  the  Christian  faith,  or  it  
could  refer  to  the  very  activity  undertaken  by  those  who  pass  on  that  content  to  others.4  
                                                
2   “Sunt   praecepta   quaedam   tractandarum   Scripturarum,   quae   studiosis   earum   video   non  
incommode  posse  tradi;  ut  non  solum  legendo  alios  qui  divinarum  Litterarum  operta  aperuerunt,  sed  et  
aliis  ipsi  aperiendo  proficiant”  (Augustine,  DDC,  Prol.1).  All  translations  are  mine.  
3  See  especially  G.  Press,  “Doctrina  in  Augustine’s  De  doctrina  Christiana,”  Philosophy  and  Rhetoric  
17  (1984):  98-­‐‑120.  
4   Different   translations   of   the   title   itself   suggest   these   various   referents.   The   title  On   Christian  
Doctrine   (as  J.  Shaw  [in  The  Nicene  and  Post-­‐‑Nicene  Fathers,  First  Series,  vol.  II  {Grand  Rapids:  Eerdmans,  
1993}]   and   D.   Robertson   [Upper   Saddle   River:   Prentice   Hall,   1997]   render   it)   suggests   a   focus   on   the  
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It   could  even  refer   to  an  entire  way  of   life,   the  “culture,”   to  which  such   teaching  and  
learning   give   rise   when   they   are   ongoing   and   thus   permeate   a   human   community.  
Now,   in   a   work   in   which   Augustine   calls   attention   to   the  multi-­‐‑layered  meaning   of  
Scripture,   there  may   be   good   reason   to   think   that   he   himself   is   operating   on   several  
levels,  and  thus  all  these  meanings  of  doctrina  Christiana  are  in  play.  Personally,  I  think  
that   this   is   the   case   and,   moreover,   that   Augustine   ties   these   meanings   together   by  
honing  in  on  the  seemingly  narrow  issue  of  how  to  read  a  book.5  
   Or  should  I  say  the  book?  For  it  is  not  just  any  book  that  Augustine  prepares  us  
to   read,   but   the   Book,   the   Bible,   sacred   Scripture.   For  Augustine,   Scripture   is   a   very  
special   book   indeed,   and   yet,   as   we   know   from   his   Confessions,   he   was   not   always  
enamored   of   it.   Early   in   his   life   Scripture   failed   to   meet   his   sophisticated   taste;  
uncircumcised   in  heart,  he  did  not  yet  have  ears   to  hear.  “For  when  I  attended  to   the  
Scripture,”  Augustine   confesses,   “I   did   not   perceive   it   as   I   now   speak   of   it;   rather,   it  
seemed   to   me   unworthy   when   I   compared   it   to   the   worthiness   of   Cicero.   For   my  
swollenness  drew  back  from  its  modus,  and  my  mind’s  focus  did  not  penetrate  its  inner  
things.”6   The   modus   of   which   Augustine   speaks   in   this   passage   likely   refers   to  
Scripture’s   “measuredness,”   i.e.,   its   understated   but   (as   Augustine   recognizes   in  De  
doctrina)   its   ultimately   appealing   and   eminently   appropriate   eloquence.   Swollen  with  
                                                                                                                                                       
content  of  the  Christian  faith,  whereas  On  Christian  Instruction  (as  J.  Gavigan  [Washington:  The  Catholic  
University   of  America   Press,   1950]   renders   it)   and   even  more   so  Teaching  Christianity   (as   E.  Hill   [New  
York:  New  City  Press,  2002]  renders  it)  suggest  a  focus  on  the  activity  of  teaching  the  Christian  faith  to  
others.  On  Christian   Teaching   (as   R.  Green   [Oxford:  Oxford  University   Press,   1997]   renders   it)   perhaps  
bridges  these  two  meanings  best,  and  for  this  reason  I  consider  it  the  best  option  in  English.  
5  Press  captures  Augustine’s  use  of  doctrina  well  when  he  writes  as   follows:  “.   .   .  doctrina  has  a  
range  of   logically   related  meanings,   of  which   the  most   general   and   inclusive   is   ‘learning’   as   a   cultural  
ideal,   and   .   .   .   Augustine,   an   accomplished   rhetorician,   deliberately   and   artfully   uses   that   variety   of  
meanings  in  order,  at  once,  to  refute  the  pagan  ideal  and  construct  a  Christian  version  of  it”  (“Doctrina  in  
Augustine’s  De  doctrina  Christiana,”  99).  
   6   “Non   enim   sicut  modo   loquor,   ita   sensi,   cum   attendi   ad   illam   scripturam,   sed   visa   est  mihi  
indigna,  quam  Tullianae  dignitati  compararem.  Tumor  enim  meus  refugiebat  modum  eius,  et  acies  mea  
non  penetrabat  interiora  eius”  (Confessiones,  III.v.9).  
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arrogance,   the   young   Augustine   failed   to   heed   the   subtle   eloquence   with   which  
Scripture  whispers  to  us  in  its  still  small  voice.  
But   after   heeding   the   call   in   the   garden   to   take   up   and   read,   Augustine’s  
perception   of   Scripture   manifestly   changed.   Indeed,   in   De   doctrina,   begun   (like   the  
Confessions)   about   ten   years   after   his   conversion   and   a   couple   of   years   after   being  
ordained  a  bishop,7  Augustine  trumpets  the  uniqueness  and  primacy  of  Scripture  as  a  
book.  In  Scripture,  he  tells  us,  one  finds  the  means  of  curing  the  maladies  of  the  human  
will;8  one  finds  the  thoughts  and  will  of  the  various  authors  of  its  many  books,  but  also  
the  very  will  of  God  who  inspired  them;9  one  finds  an  overflow  of  meaningfulness  that  
eludes   any   individual   reader’s   comprehension   and   that   can   be   imbibed   ever   more  
deeply—yet  always   in  ways   that   the  Spirit   foresees.10  As  mentioned  above,  moreover,  
Augustine   avows   Scripture’s   rhetorical   worthiness;   for,   he   claims,   the   authors   of  
Scripture  display  a  singular  and  unsurpassable  eloquence  whereby  they  articulate  their  
thoughts  in  precisely  the  right  manner.  Hence  one  finds  in  Scripture  an  eloquence  that  
                                                
7  As  is  often  noted  by  scholars,  DDC  was  actually  written  in  two  very  distinct  phases  that  stood  
thirty  years  apart.  The  Prologue  and  Books  I-­‐‑II  were  published  soon  after  his  ordination  to  the  episcopate,  
and   thirty   years   later   Augustine   completed   the   work   by   publishing   the   remaining   two   books.  
Admittedly,  one  may  notice  different   emphases   in   these   two  “parts”  of   the  work   (the   latter   two  books  
seem  more  “pastoral”  in  character),  and  yet  the  work  clearly  stands  as  a  single  treatise.  In  other  words,  
the   second   phase   of   writing   carries   through   on   the   single   plan   laid   out   in   Book   I.   In   what   follows,  
therefore,  I  will  treat  the  Prologue  and  Books  I-­‐‑IV  as  a  single  piece  of  writing.  
8   “Ex   quo   factum   est   ut   etiam   Scriptura   divina,   qua   tantis   morbis   humanarum   voluntatum  
subvenitur  .  .  .”  (DDC,  II.5.6).  
9   “Quam   legentes   nihil   aliud   appetunt   quam   cogitationes   voluntatemque   illorum   a   quibus  
conscripta   est   invenire   et   per   illas   voluntatem   Dei,   secundum   quam   tales   homines   locutos   credimus”  
(DDC,   II.5.6).  Cf.:   “In  his  omnibus   libris   timentes  Deum  et  pietate  mansueti  quaerunt  voluntatem  Dei”  
(DDC,  II.9.14).  
10  “…  et  ipsam  sententiam  forsitan  vidit  et  certe  Dei  Spiritus,  qui  per  eum  haec  operatus  est,  etiam  
ipsam   occursuram   lectori   vel   auditori   sine   dubitatione   praevidit,   immo   ut   occurreret,   quia   et   ipsa   est  
veritate   subnixa,   providit.   Nam   quid   in   divinis   eloquiis   largius   et   uberius   potuit   divinitus   provideri,  
quam   ut   eadem   verba   pluribus   intellegantur   modis,   quos   alia   non   minus   divina   contestantia   faciant  
approbari?”  (DDC,  III.27.38).  
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befits   the  authority  of  divinely-­‐‑inspired  writers.11   In   light  of  such  an  impressive   list  of  
things  one  can  find  in  Scripture,  it  is  little  wonder  that  Augustine  undertakes  an  entire  
work  to  prepare  us  to  read  this  book  insightfully.  
   According  to  Augustine,  then,  learning  to  read  Scriptrue  is  well  worth  whatever  
effort   it   takes.   But  what   does   Scripture’s   elevated   status   in  Augustine’s   eyes   have   to  
with  liberal  education?  A  lot,  I  think,  and  part  of  the  evidence  comes  from  a  passage  in  
De   doctrina   in   which   Augustine   suggests   something   else   that   can   be   found   in  
Scripture—something   that   an   educated   reader   may   find   startling.   For,   Augustine  
writes,  “although  there  [i.e.,   in  Scripture]  anyone  would  discover  all   the  things  he  has  
learned  usefully  elsewhere,  there  also  he  will  find  much  more  abundantly  those  things  
that  he  will  never  find  at  all  elsewhere,  but  that  are  taught  only  in  the  wondrous  height  
and   wondrous   lowliness   of   these   Scriptures.”12   Could   a   bolder   statement   about  
Scripture  be  made?  All  that  one  has  learned  usefully  apart  from  Scripture  can  be  found  
in  Scripture,  and  then  some!  From  this  claim  it  seems  a  small  step  to  say  that  to  learn  to  
read  Scripture  is  to  become  learned  simply;  for  Scripture  is  somehow  saturated  with  all  
that  can  be  learned  usefully  elsewhere.  
   Taken  on  its  own,  however,  this  passage  is  insufficient;  for  we  need  to  know  the  
reasons   behind   this   claim.   I   bring  up   this   passage   at   this   point,   however,   in   order   to  
                                                
11   “Nam   ubi   eos   intellego,   non   solum   nihil   eis   sapientius,   verum   etiam   nihil   eloquentius  mihi  
videri  potest.  Et  audeo  dicere  omnes  qui  recte  intellegunt  quod  illi   loquuntur,  simul  intellegere  non  eos  
aliter   loqui  debuisse.  Sicut  est  enim  quaedam  eloquentia  quae  magis  aetatem  iuvenilem  decet,  est  quae  
senilem,  nec  iam  dicenda  est  eloquentia  si  personae  non  congruat  eloquentis;  ita  est  quaedam,  quae  viros  
summa  auctoritate  dignissimos  planeque  divinos  decet.  Haec  illi  locuti  sunt,  nec  ipsos  decet  alia  nec  alios  
ipsa.  Ipsis  enim  congruit;  alios  autem,  quanto  videtur  humilior,  tanto  altius  non  ventositate,  sed  soliditate  
transcendit.  Ubi  vero  non  eos   intellego,  minus  quidem  mihi  apparet   eorum  eloquentia,   sed  eam   tamen  
non  dubito  esse  talem,  qualis  est  ubi  intellego.  Ipsa  quoque  obscuritas  divinorum  salubriumque  dictorum  
tali  eloquentiae  miscenda  fuerat,  in  qua  proficere  noster  intellectus,  non  solum  inventione,  verum  etiam  
exercitatione  deberet”  (DDC,  IV.6.9).  
12  “Et  cum  ibi  quisque  invenerit  omnia  quae  utiliter  alibi  didicit,  multo  abundantius  ibi  inveniet  
ea  quae  nusquam  omnino  alibi,  sed  in  illarum  tantummodo  Scripturarum  mirabili  altitudine  et  mirabili  
humilitate  discuntur”  (DDC,  II.42.63).  
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alert   us   to   just   how   much   value   Augustine   places   on   learning   to   read   Scripture.  
Scripture  has  much  to   teach;   in   fact,   it  may  contain  everything  worth   learning.  Seeing  
why  Augustine  thinks  this,  however,  requires  some  familiarity  with  the  structure  of  De  
doctrina  as  a  whole  as  well  as  a  sense  of  what  Augustine  aims  to  accomplish  by  showing  
us   how   to   read   Scripture.13   In   the   remainder   of   this   section,   then,   I   provide   a   brief  
synopsis   of  De   doctrina  with   a   view   both   to   understanding   Augustine’s   claim   about  
Scripture’s   inclusion   of   all   useful   learning   and   to   providing   a   backdrop   for   the  
investigation  of  other  parts  of  De  doctrina  that  we  undertake  below.  
   As   we   have   already   seen,   Augustine   opens  De   doctrina   by   alluding   to   certain  
precepts  for  treating  Scripture  that  he  hopes  to  pass  on  to  those  eager  to  learn  them.  At  
the  start  of  Book  I,  he  specifies  further  what  this  treatment  of  Scripture  involves:  
There   are   two   realities   on   which   every   treatment   of   the   Scriptures  
depends:   the   modus   of   coming   upon   those   things   that   are   to   be  
understood,   and   the   modus   of   presenting   those   things   that   have   been  
understood.   First   we   will   discuss   the   coming-­‐‑upon,   and   after   this,   the  
presenting.14  
The  two  instances  of  the  untranslated  modus  now  doubt  stand  out  at  this  point;  we  will  
discuss  below  the  notion  of  modus  in  section  II.  It  is  sufficient  to  notice  at  this  point  that  
Augustine  divides  De   doctrina   into   two  major  parts:   a   first   part   that   concerns   coming  
upon  things  to  be  understood  in  Scripture,  which  Augustine  undertakes  in  Books  I–III;  
and  a  second  part  that  concerns  presenting  the  things  that  have  been  understood,  which  
Augustine  undertakes  in  Book  IV.  The  second  part  of  Augustine’s  discussion,  which  is  
concerned  with  presenting,   requires   little   explanation.   In  Book   IV  Augustine   outlines  
                                                
   13  A  more  in-­‐‑depth  articulation  of  the  parts  of  De  doctrina  Christiana  can  be  found  in  G.  Press,  “The  
Subject  and  Structure  of  Augustine’s  De  doctrina  Christiana,”  Augustinian  Studies  11  (1980):  99-­‐‑124.  
14   “Duae   sunt   res   quibus   nititur   omnis   tractatio   Scripturarum,   modus   inveniendi   quae  
intellegenda  sunt  et  modus  proferendi  quae   intellecta   sunt.  De   inveniendo  prius,  de  proferendo  postea  
disseremus”  (DDC,  I.1.1).  
Matthew  D.  WALZ        
  
ARTS  OF  LIBERTY  1:1                                                     SUMMER  2013  
 
58
the   rhetorical   disposition   needed   in   someone   who   wants   to   convey   effectively   the  
things   that  he  has  understood   in  Scripture.  We  will  briefly  consider     his  discussion  of  
this   is   section   III.   The   concern   of   the   first   part   of  De   doctrina   (i.e.,   Books   I–III)   does  
require   explanation,   both   because   the   discussion   is   more   complex   and   because   it   is  
more  central  to  the  overall  project  of  De  doctrina.  Indeed,  what  Augustine  does  in  Book  
IV  is  among  the  consequences  of  what  he  has  done  in  Books  I-­‐‑III.  
   In  Books  I-­‐‑III  of  De  doctrina  Augustine  deals  with  coming  upon  “the  things  to  be  
understood”  in  Scripture.  The  grammar  of  this  phrase  in  Latin,  quae  intellegenda  sunt—a  
future-­‐‑oriented  phrase   that  employs   the  passive  paraphrastic—suggests   that  Scripture  
is  pregnant  with  intelligibilities  waiting  to  be  sought  out  and  unearthed.  In  relation  to  
us   intelligent   creatures,   then,   Scripture   stands   as   an   intellectual   task;   buried  within   it  
are  “things  to  be  understood”—or,  more  imperatively,  things  that  should  or  ought  to  be  
understood.   We   can   clarify   what   Augustine   means   here   by   considering   that   in   the  
Prologue  he  likens  what  he  is  doing  in  De  doctrina  to  teaching  someone  how  to  read—
not,  that  is,  how  to  read  this  or  that  book,  but  how  to  read,  period.15  The  comparison  is  
telling.  For  when  a  child  learns  to  read,  a  new  world  of  intelligibilities  opens  up  for  him.  
Those  metal  signs  along  the  road  that  used  to  appear  merely  as  arrangements  of  colored  
figures  now  bear  information.  Odd  little  shapes  moving  across  the  bottom  of  a  TV  news  
channel  no  longer  stream  by  without  notice;  instead,  they  tell  of  seemingly  newsworthy  
events—and  lead  to  uncomfortable  questions  for  Mom  and  Dad!  Hence  learning  to  read  
                                                
   15  “Qui  legit  audientibus  litteras,  utique  quas  agnoscit  enuntiat;  qui  autem  ipsas  litteras  tradit,  hoc  
agit   ut   alii   quoque   legere   noverint;   uterque   tamen   id   insinuat   quod   accepit.   Sic   etiam   qui   ea   quae   in  
Scripturis   intellegit   exponit   audientibus,   tamquam   litteras  quas  agnoscit  pronuntiat   lectoris  officio.  Qui  
autem  praecipit   quomodo   intellegendum   sit,   similis   est   tradenti   litteras,   hoc   est   praecipienti   quomodo  
legendum  sit;  ut,   quomodo   ille  qui   legere  novit   alio   lectore  non   indiget,   cum  codicem   invenerit,   a  quo  
audiat  quid  ibi  scriptum  sit,  sic   iste  qui  praecepta  quae  conamur  tradere  acceperit,  cum  in  libris  aliquid  
obscuritatis   invenerit,  quasdam  regulas  velut  litteras  tenens  intellectorem  alium  non  requirat,  per  quem  
sibi  quod  opertum  est  retegatur,  sed  quibusdam  vestigiis  indagatis  ad  occultum  sensum  sine  ullo  errore  
ipse  perveniat  aut  certe  in  absurditatem  pravae  sententiae  non  incidat”  (DDC,  Prol.9).  
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multiplies  the  “teaching  moments”  in  a  child’s   life;   for  the  child  is  made  capable  with  
respect  to  meanings  hidden  in  certain  shapes  that  hitherto  were  just  shapes.  The  child’s  
new   capacity   allows   these   shapes   to   mean   something,   to   convey   intelligibilities   that  
they   seemed   not   to   convey   before.   The   letters   can   now   teach,   the   child   can   learn.  
Likewise,  Augustine  is  suggesting,  Scripture  is  replete  with  “things  to  be  understood.”  
If  disposed  correctly,  we  who  “treat”  (tractare)  or  deal  with  Scripture  are  able  to   learn  
from  it  in  ways  we  were  hitherto  unable.  Like  a  child  who  acquires  literacy  and  is  thus  
disposed   to   come   upon   the   intelligibilities   beneath   conventional   symbols,   we   who  
acquire   the  proper   “mindset”—or,   perhaps  more   accurately,   the  proper   “soulset”—to  
read   Scripture   are   enabled   to   grasp   the   intelligibilities   that   lie   beneath   its   textual  
surface.  
   Subsequently   in   Book   I,   moreover,   Augustine   points   out   that   “all   teaching  
[doctrina]   is   of   realities   or   of   signs,   but   realities   are   learned   through   signs.”  We   can  
makes  sense  of  this,  too,  in  light  of  a  child  who  learns  to  read.  For  there  are  two  facets  to  
learning   to   read.  On   the   one  hand,   the   child  must   already  be   aware   or  must   become  
simultaneously  aware  of  the  realities  to  which  the  written  signs  point,  since  otherwise  
the  perceptible  signs  will  fail  to  register  or  to  signify  anything.  On  the  other  hand,  the  
child  must  be  shown  how  to  interpret  those  signs  (i.e.,  the  written  letter-­‐‑sets)  that  point  
to   different   realities,   which   is   usually   accomplished   by   relating   those   signs   to   vocal  
sounds.  Learning   to   read,   then,   involves   the   learning  both  realities  and  signs,  as  does  
the  complementary  activity  of  the  one  who  teaches  the  budding  reader.  
   If   we   follow   through   on   the   analogy   between   learning   to   read   simply   and  
learning  to  read  Scripture,  we  can  see  that  the  latter  is  twofold  as  well.  On  the  one  hand,  
we  budding  readers  of  Scripture  must  be  disposed  to  grasp  rightly  the  realities  to  which  
Scripture’s   signs  point,   i.e.,  we  must  be  “ontologically”  disposed   in   the   right  manner.  
On   the  other  hand,  we  must  be  disposed   to   interpret   rightly   those  signs   that  point   to  
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realities,   i.e.,   we   must   be   “semiotically”   or   “hermeneutically”   disposed   in   the   right  
manner.   In   the   remainder   of   Book   I,   then,   Augustine   disposes   us   “ontologically”   by  
articulating  the  manner  in  which  we  should  apprehend  the  realities  to  which  Scripture  
points—which   include,   ultimately,   all   realities,   Uncreated   and   created;   whereas   in  
Books   II–III,   he   disposes   us   “semiotically”   or   “hermeneutically”   by   showing   us   the  
manner   in  which  we  should  deal  with  and   interpret   the  signs   that  Scripture  employs.  
Disposing  us   semiotically  or  hermeneutically   is  broken  down   further  as   follows:  after  
disposing  us  toward  the  signs  in  Scripture  in  a  general  way  at  the  beginning  of  Book  II,  
Augustine   then   considers   how   to   deal   with   signs   that   are   especially   difficult   to  
understand,   namely,   unknown   signs   and   ambiguous   signs;   he   discusses   how   to   deal  
with  unknown  signs  in  the  remainder  of  Book  II,  while  in  Book  III  he  discusses  how  to  
deal  with  the  ambiguous  signs.  
   It   turns  out,  then,  that  Augustine’s  endeavor  in  De  doctrina   to  enable  us  to  read  
Scripture  so  as  to  unveil   its  hidden  intelligibilities   is  not  so  simple—just  as  enabling  a  
child  simply  to  read  is  not  so  simple.  But  both  are  worth  the  effort.  Indeed,  learning  to  
read  is  a  process  whereby  new  intelligible  dimensions  of  reality  begin  to  open  up,  and  
undergoing   this   process   can   be   the   grounds   for   a   lifelong   pursuit   of   knowledge   and  
wisdom.  And   if   learning   to   read   Scripture   is   analogous   to   this,   then  Augustine   is   on  
target   when   he   says   that   what   he   is   doing   in   De   doctrina   is   “a   great   and   arduous  
work.”16  For   it   involves  disposing  us  who   read  Scripture   toward  new   insight   into   the  
character  of  all   realities—God,  human  beings,  and  all  else.  We  must  be  “ontologically  
disposed”   inasmuch   as   the   becoming-­‐‑flesh   of   God   has   brought   to   light   the   true   and  
ultimate  intelligibility  of  every  reality,  and  our  metaphysical  vision  must  be  adjusted  in  
order   to  see   this.   In  addition,  we  must  be  “semiotically  disposed”  by   learning  how  to  
                                                
   16   “Duae   sunt   res   quibus   nititur   omnis   tractatio   Scripturarum,   modus   inveniendi   quae  
intellegenda  sunt  et  modus  proferendi  quae   intellecta   sunt.  De   inveniendo  prius,  de  proferendo  postea  
disseremus.  Magnum  opus  et  arduum  …”  (DDC,  I.1.1).  
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deal  with  the  signs  of  Scripture.  This  latter  task  potentially  entails  our  learning  all  that  
we  can  usefully  learn  apart  from  Scripture,  inasmuch  as  Scripture  is  replete  with  signs  
that   can  be   interpreted  only   in   light   of   our  knowledge  of   languages,   nature,   number,  
music,   human   institutions,   history,   arts   and   crafts,   or   logic.   Such   useful   knowledge,  
therefore,  allows  us  to  come  upon  “the  things  to  be  understood”  in  Scripture,  including  
both   the   signs   that   Scripture   employs   as   well   as   the   realities   to   which   these   signs  
point—which  in  their  turn  may  point  to  even  greater  realities.  
   It  follows,  then,  that  the  more  we  possess  the  kind  of  knowledge  and  insight  that  
constitutes  a  liberally  educated  human  being,  the  better  enabled  we  are  to  understand  
Scripture.   Such   an   education   cultivates   in   us   a   search   for   ultimate   wisdom   (as   did  
Augustine’s  reading  of  Cicero’s  Hortensius)  and  sensitizes  us  to  the  fullness  of  meaning  
behind  Scripture’s  manifold  signs  and  the  realities  to  which  they  point.  In  this  sense  at  
least,   therefore,  a  person  discovers   in  Scripture  “all   the   things  he  has   learned  usefully  
elsewhere.”   These   things   are   there   insofar   as   Scripture   both   addresses   the   true   and  
ultimate   intelligibility   of   all   realities   and   employs   signs   whose   meanings   are   fully  
discerned  by  those  possessed  of  a  well-­‐‑rounded  knowledge  of  humanly-­‐‑  and  divinely-­‐‑
instituted  things.  
This   overview   of   De   doctrina   suggests   the   comprehensive   character   of  
Augustine’s  attempt  to  enable  us  to  read  Scripture.  At  issue  in  the  work,  then,  is  a  new  
and  deeper  apprehension  of  the  whole  of  reality  as  well  as  of  its  divine  source.  Learning  
to  read  Scripture,  therefore,  involves  a  re-­‐‑education  concerning  reality,  not  only  because  
Scripture   reveals   the   keys   for   unlocking   the   full   intelligibility   of   realities,   but   also  
because  it  stands  as  the  Book  of  books,  i.e.,  as  the  Book  that  in  some  manner  contains  all  
that  is  usefully  learned  from  other  books  and  other  experiences  of  reality.17  De  doctrina,  
                                                
17  Admittedly,  Augustine  is  not  perfectly  clear  about  the  manner  in  which  Scripture  contains  all  
useful  learning.  One  might  say,  in  fact,  that  the  manner  of  containment  is  worked  out  over  the  course  of  
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therefore,   is   not   only   about   how   to   interpret   Scripture;   it   is,   in   addition,   about  what  
Scripture  itself  is  about,  namely,  every  reality  that  is  as  well  as  the  cause  of  every  reality  
that   is.   In   this  work,   then,  Augustine   is   showing   us   how   to   go   about   navigating   the  
waters  or  reality  by  showing  us  how  to  navigate  the  waters  of  Scripture.    
It   is  appropriate,   I  believe,   to   include  at   the  end  of   this  section  what   is  perhaps  
the  best-­‐‑known  passage  from  De  doctrina,   in  which  Augustine  suggests  the  attitude  he  
hopes  to  foster  in  us  toward  knowledge  we  acquire  apart  from  Scripture.  How  should  
we   treat   or   deal   with   the   manifold   knowledge   that   was   achieved   to   one   degree   or  
another   by   the   most   illuminated,   the   most   liberally   educated,   among   the   pagans,  
especially   the   Platonic   philosophers?   Augustine   answers   this   question   by   alluding,  
fittingly,  to  a  paradigmatic  event  of  appropriation  narrated  in  Scripture.  He  writes:  
                                                                                                                                                       
the  Middle  Ages,  as  various  thinkers  appropriate  and  integrate  what  they  learn  from  pagan  works  with  
what  they  learn  from  Scripture.  In  order  to  witness  the  climax  of  this  appropriation  and  integration,  one  
should  turn  to  Bonaventure,  especially  his  early  work  De  reductione  artium  ad  theologiam   (On  Leading  the  
Arts  Back  to  Theology)  and  his  late  work  Collationes  in  Hexaemeron  (Conferences  on  the  Six  Days  of  Creation).  
Consider,   e.g.,   the   words   with   which   Bonaventure   concludes   the   former   work,   which   clearly  
alludes   to  what   he   has   seen   in   his   reading   of  DDC:   “Et   sic   patet,   quomodo  multiformis   sapientia  Dei,  
quae   lucide   traditur   in   sacra   Scriptura,   occultatur   in   omni   cognitione   et   in   omni   natura.   Patet   etiam,  
quomodo   omnes   cognitiones   famulantur   theologiae;   et   ideo   ipsa   assumit   exempla   et   utitur   vocabulis  
pertinentibus  ad  omne  genus   cognitionis.  Patet   etiam,  quam  ampla   sit  via   illuminativa,   et  quomodo   in  
omni   re,   quae   sentitur   sive   quae   cognoscitur,   interius   lateat   ipse   Deus.  —   Et   hic   est   fructus   omnium  
scientiarum,   ut   in   omnibus   aedificetur   fides,   honorificetur   Deus,   componantur   mores,   hauriantur  
consolationes,  quae  sunt  in  unione  sponsi  et  sponsae,  quae  quidem  fit  per  caritatem,  ad  quam  terminatur  
tota   intentio   sacrae   Scripturae,   et   per   consequens   omnis   illuminatio   desursum  descendens,   et   sine   qua  
omnis   cognitio  vana  est,  quia  nunquam  pervenitur  ad  Filium  nisi  per  Spiritum  sanctum,  qui  docet  nos  
omnem  veritatem,  qui  est  benedictus   in  saecula  saeculorum.  Amen”   (De  reductione  artium  ad   theologiam,  
26).   [“And  so   it   is   clear   in  what  manner  God’s  multiform  wisdom,  which   is   lightedly  handed  down   in  
sacred  Scripture,  is  concealed  in  every  recognition  and  in  every  nature.  Also,  it  is  clear  in  what  manner  all  
recognitions   serve   theology,   and   thus   theology   takes   to   itself   examples   and   uses   terms   that   pertain   to  
every  kind  of   recognition.  Also,   it   is   clear  how  ample   is   the  way   that   is   able   to   enlighten   and   in  what  
manner  God  himself  lies  hidden  within  in  every  reality  that  is  sensed  or  that  is  recognized.  —  And  here  is  
the   fruit   of   all   sciences:   that   in   all   things   faith  may   be   built   up,   God  may   be   honored,  mores  may   be  
brought   together,  consolations  may  be  drawn  out—consolations   that  exist   in   the  union  of  husband  and  
wife,   which   come-­‐‑to-­‐‑be   through   charity.   Sacred   Scriptures   whole   intention—and,   consequently,   every  
enlightening  coming  down  from  above—is  brought  to  an  end  at  charity,  without  which  every  recognition  
is  empty,  because  never  is  one  brought  through  to  the  Son  except  through  the  Holy  Spirit,  who  teaches  us  
all  truth,  who  is  blessed  into  ages  of  ages.  Amen.”]  
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Now   those   who   are   called   philosophers—especially   the   Platonists—if  
perhaps  they  said  things  true  and  fitted  to  our  faith,  not  only  are  these  not  
to  be  feared,  but  from  them  even  as  from  unjust  possessors  they  are  to  be  
claimed   for   our   use.   For   just   as   the   Egyptians   not   only   had   idols   and  
heavy   burdens,   which   the   people   of   Israel   detested   and   fled,   but   also  
vases   and  ornaments   of   gold   and   silver   and   clothing,  which   this  people  
going  out  of  Egypt  claimed  secretly  for  themselves  for  a  better  use,  not  by  
their   own   authority,   but   by   a   precept   of   God,   while   the   Egyptians  
themselves  unknowingly  bestowed  these  things  that  they  were  not  using  
well;  so  also  all  the  doctrines  of  the  nations  not  only  have  counterfeit  and  
superstitious   figments  and  heavy  bundles  of  pointless   labor,  which  each  
of  us,  going  out  of  the  society  of  the  nations  with  Christ  as  leader,  ought  to  
abominate   and   avoid,   but   also   contain   liberal   disciplines   more   apt   to  
truth’s   use   and   some   very   useful   moral   precepts,   and   among   them   are  
found   several   true   things   about   the   one  God  who   is   to   be  worshipped.  
Among  these  things,  that  which  is  gold  and  silver—which  the  nations  did  
not   establish,   but   rather   uncovered   from   certain   mines,   as   it   were,   of  
divine   providence   that   are   poured   out   everywhere,   and   which   they  
abused   perversely   and   injuriously   toward   the   services   of   demons—the  
Christian,  when  he  separates  himself  in  his  soul  from  the  pitiable  society  
of  the  gentiles,  ought  to  carry  away  toward  the   just  use  of  preaching  the  
Gospel.  And   their   clothing,   that   is,   the   things   instituted  by  men   that  are  
yet  suitable  to  human  society,  which  in  this  life  we  cannot  be  without,  he  
is  allowed  to  take  and  have  as  things  to  be  converted  to  Christian  use.18  
                                                
18  “Philosophi  autem  qui  vocantur,  si  qua  forte  vera  et  fidei  nostrae  accomodata  dixerunt,  maxime  
Platonici,  non  solum  formidanda  non  sunt,  sed  ab  eis  etiam  tamquam  ab  iniustis  possessoribus  in  usum  
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The   Jews’   despoliation   of   the   Egyptians   provides   a   concrete   basis   for   our   imagining  
how  liberal  education  is  caught  up  into  the  activity  of  evangelization,  grounded  in  an  
understanding  of  Scripture,  to  which  each  Christian  is  called.  In  addition,  this  passage  
concretizes   two   other,   more   abstract   assertions   that   Augustine   makes   earlier   in   De  
doctrina.  The  first  is  from  the  Prologue,  when  he  responds  as  follows  to  those  who  glory  
in  their  understanding  of  what  is  obscure  in  Scripture:  
[N]o   one   ought   so   to   have   something   as   if   it   were   his   own   {suum  
proprium},  except  perhaps  a  lie.  For  every  true  thing  is  from  him  who  said,  
“I  am  the  truth.”  For  what  do  we  have  that  we  have  not  received?  And  if  
we  have  received  it,  why  do  we  glory  as  if  we  did  not  receive  it?19  
Just  as  the  one  who  glories  in  his  ability  to  understand  the  obscurities  of  Scripture  does  
not   appropriately   have   that   ability,   so   the   Egyptians   did   not   appropriately   own   their  
possessions,   and   neither   did   the   nations   appropriately   possess   their   learning.   It   is  
incumbent  on   the  Christian,   then,  not   to  deny   the   existence  of   such  accomplishments  
among  the  nations,  but  to  appropriate  them  in  a  way  that   involves  recognition  of  and  
gratitude  toward  the  God  who  has  provided  them.  Indeed,  in  a  second  passage,  which  
                                                                                                                                                       
nostrum  vindicanda.  Sicut  enim  Aegyptii  non  tantum  idola  habebant  et  onera  gravia,  quae  populus  Israel  
detestaretur   et   fugeret,   sed   etiam   vasa   atque   ornamenta   de   auro   et   de   argento   et   vestem,   quae   ille  
populus  exiens  de  Aegypto  sibi  potius  tamquam  ad  usum  meliorem  clanculo  vindicavit,  non  auctoritate  
propria,  sed  praecepto  Dei,  ipsis  Aegyptiis  nescienter  commodantibus  ea  quibus  non  bene  utebantur;  sic  
doctrinae   omnes   Gentilium   non   solum   simulata   et   superstitiosa   figmenta   gravesque   sarcinas  
supervacanei   laboris   habent,   quae   unusquisque   nostrum,   duce   Christo,   de   societate   Gentilium   exiens,  
debet  abominari  atque  devitare,  sed  etiam  liberales  disciplinas  usui  veritatis  aptiores  et  quaedam  morum  
praecepta  utilissima  continent,  deque  ipso  uno  Deo  colendo  nonnulla  vera  inveniuntur  apud  eos.  Quod  
eorum  tamquam  aurum  et  argentum  quod  non  ipsi  instituerunt,  sed  de  quibusdam  quasi  metallis  divinae  
providentiae,  quae  ubique  infusa  est,  eruerunt,  et  quo  perverse  atque  iniuriose  ad  obsequia  daemonum  
abutuntur,  cum  ab  eorum  misera  societate  sese  animo  separat,  debet  ab  eis  auferre  Christianus  ad  usum  
iustum   praedicandi   Evangelii.   Vestem   quoque   illorum,   id   est,   hominum   quidem   instituta,   sed   tamen  
accomodata   humanae   societati   qua   in   hac   vita   carere   non   possumus,   accipere   atque   habere   licuerit   in  
usum  convertenda  Christianum”  (DDC,  II.40.60).  
19   “…  nemo  debet   aliquid   sic   habere   quasi   suum  proprium,   nisi   forte  mendacium.  Nam  omne  
verum  ab  illo  est  qui  ait:  Ego  sum  veritas.  Quid  enim  habemus  quod  non  accepimus?  Quod  si  accepimus,  
quid  gloriamur  quasi  non  acceperimus?”  (DDC,  Prol.8).  
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is  from  Book  II  and  comes  just  prior  to  long  passage  quoted  above,  Augustine  expresses  
the   same   thought   even   more   concisely.   “Whoever   is   a   good   and   true   Christian  
understands,”  he  says,  “that  wherever  he  may  find  the  truth,  it  is  his  Lord’s.”20  
   At  least  two  points  should  be  taken  away  from  these  passages  before  moving  to  
section  II.  The  first  is  subtle  but  crucial,  namely,  Augustine’s  assertion  that  true  things  
not  only  come  from  God,  but  in  fact  are  God’s;  in  other  words,  it  is  God’s  mines  that  we  
are  ultimately  mining.  God  owns   true   things;  hence  we   in   turn  ought   to  stand  toward  
true  things  not  as  owners,  but  as  stewards.  Thus  when  we  dig  up  gold  from  the  mines  
of  divine  providence,  we  should  not  take  possession  of  it  as  if  it  were  ours;  rather,  we  
should  care  for  it  as  God’s,  with  a  view  to  purifying  it  as  much  as  we  can  and  bearing  it  
back   to   its   rightful   owner.   This   fundamental   orientation   of   all   truths   toward  God   as  
their  rightful  owner  already  begins  to  suggest  how  Augustine  intends  to  modify  liberal  
education.  
   A  second  point  is  less  subtle  but  perhaps  more  relevant  to  this  first  section  of  the  
paper,   namely,   that   God   owns   all   true   things.   Consequently,   it   behooves   those   who  
wish   to   align   themselves  with  God   and   to   understand   Scripture   to   take   stewardship  
over  all  true  things  that  they  find,  no  matter  where  they  may  find  them—whether  in  the  
writings   of   the   Platonici   or   other   philosophers,   in   history,   in   the   arts,   in   human  
institutions,  or  anywhere  else.  This  potential  stewardship  over  all   truths  opens  up  the  
broadest  of  scopes  for  the  inquiring  Christian  who  desires  to  understand  Scripture.  For  
it   is  a   scope   that  encompasses  all   created  realities   insofar  as  one  can  draw  from  them  
any  truths  that  lend  themselves  to  insight  into  the  signs  employed  in  Scripture  as  well  
as   into   the   realities—God,   human  beings,   and   all   others—to  which   these   signs  point.  
Hence,   if   liberal   education   consists   in   a   pursuit   of   wisdom   about   reality   in   order   to  
                                                
20  “…  quisquis  bonus  verusque  Christianus  est,  Domini  sui  esse  intellegat,  ubicumque  invenerit  
veritatem  …”  (DDC,  II.18.28).  
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navigate  it  freely  and  excellently,  and  if  such  an  education  was  also  the  aim  of  the  great  
pagan  thinkers  and  philosophers,  then  one  will  be  a  better  reader  of  Scripture  the  more  
one   progresses   in   such   an   education   and   learns   from   both   Christians   and   non-­‐‑
Christians  alike.  
   To  be  sure,  unlike  educated  pagans,  the  Christian  is  admonished  to  appropriate  
liberal  education  “Christianly.”  To  employ  a  theme  taken  up  later  in  the  Middle  Ages,  
Christians   are   urged   to   read   the   “book   of   nature”   in   light   of  what   is   revealed   in   the  
“book   of   Scripture,”   as   well   as   to   read   Scripture   in   light   of   what   they   read   and  
understand   in   the   book   of   nature.21  How  does   such   an   intertextual   reading   of   reality  
modify   liberal   education?  This   question  drives   our   inquiry   in   the   next   section   of   this  
paper.  
  
II.  Christianizing  Ontology  et  omnia  res  
As  we  saw  above,  Augustine  begins  Book  I  of  De  doctrina  thus:  
There  are   two  realities  on  which  all   treatment  of  Scriptures  depends:   the  
modus   of   coming   upon   those   things   that   are   to   be   understood   and   the  
modus   of   presenting   those   things   that   have   been   understood.   We   will  
discuss  the  coming-­‐‑upon  first,  and  after  this,  the  presenting.  This  is  a  great  
                                                
21  Although  Augustine  does  not   thematize   the   idea  of  a  “book  of  nature,”  as  do   later  Christian  
thinkers   like   Bonaventure,   it   seems   to   me   that   the   seeds   of   this   theme   are   present   in   DDC.   (It   is  
noteworthy  that  Augustine  did  think  of  nature  as  a  book  at   least  one  time  of  which  I  am  aware:  “At  si  
universam   creaturam   ita   prius   aspiceres,   ut   auctori   Deo   tribueres,   quasi   legens   magnum   quemdam  
librum   naturae   rerum;   atque   ita   si   quid   ibi   te   offenderet,   causam   te   tamquam   hominem   latere   posse  
potius   crederes,   quam   in   operibus   Dei   quidquam   reprehendere   auderes;   numquam   incidisses   in  
sacrilegas  nugas  et  blasphema  figmenta,  quibus,  non  intellegens  unde  sit  malum,  Deum  implere  conaris  
omnibus  malis”  [Contra  Faustum,  XXXII.20].)  Augustine,  then,  may  have  been  comfortable  with  the  image  
of  nature  or   creation   as   a   book   to  be  understood   just   as   Scripture   is.   If   so,   then   a   crucial   ingredient   in  
becoming  an  insightlful  reader  of  Scripture  is  to  be  an  insightful  reader  of  the  book  of  nature  or  creation.  
And,  indeed,  the  mutual  illumination  of  these  two  books  would  likely  reveal  more  and  more  “things  to  
be  understood”  in  both.  
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and  arduous  work,  and   if   it   is  difficult   to   sustain,   I   fear   lest   I  be   rash   in  
undertaking  it.22  
The  word  modus   in  this  passage  has  been  rendered  variously,  such  as  “way,”  “mode,”  
or   “process,”23   to   name   a   few.   And   on   the   basis   of   this   passage   alone,   it   would   be  
difficult  to  argue  that  any  one  of  these  renderings  is  inaccurate.  None  of  them,  however,  
captures  the  root  meaning  of  modus  as  “measure.”  Yet,  owing  to  the   influence  of  both  
Plotinus  and  Cicero,  the  notion  of  modus  as  measure  makes  its  presence  felt  regularly  in  
Augustine’s   early   thinking   about   both   God   and   morality.   From   Plotinus   Augustine  
appropriates  an  “ontological”   sense  of  measure,   since  Plotinus   identifies   the  One   (the  
highest  divine  hypostasis)   as   “the  measure   and   limit   of   all   things.”24   Indeed,   at   times  
Augustine  even  describes  God  the  Father  as  summus  modus,  the  “abovemost  measure.”25  
                                                
22   “Duae   sunt   res   quibus   nititur   omnis   tractatio   Scripturarum,   modus   inveniendi   quae  
intellegenda  sunt  et  modus  proferendi  quae   intellecta   sunt.  De   inveniendo  prius,  de  proferendo  postea  
disseremus.   Magnum   opus   et   arduum,   et   si   ad   sustinendum   difficile,   vereor   ne   ad   suscipiendum  
temerarium”  (DDC,  I.1.1).  
23  These   renderings  are  by  D.  Robertson,  R.  Green,   and   J.   Shaw,   respectively.  For  bibliographic  
information,  see  note  4.  
24  Enneads  I.1.2:  .  .  .  µμέέτρον  πάάντων  καὶ  πέέραϛ.  (In  Latin,  µμέέτρον  is  usually  rendered  modus.)  See  
also  Enneads  V.5.4,  where  Plotinus  describes  the  One  as  µμέέτρον  .  .  .  αυ ̓τὸ  καὶ  ου ̓  µμετρούύµμενον,  “measure  
itself  and  not  measured.”  Such  passages  suggest  that  for  Plotinus  the  One  is  the  ultimate  “real  horizon”  
against  which  the  being  and  intelligibility  of  other  realities  are  assessed.  
25  Consider,  e.g.,  the  following  passage  from  De  beata  vita,  which  was  written  prior  to  De  doctrina:  
“Quae   est   autem   dicenda   sapientia,   nisi   quae   Dei   Sapientia   est?   Accepimus   autem   etiam   auctoritate  
divina,  Dei  Filium  nihil  esse  aliud  quam  Dei  Sapientiam  [cf.  I  Cor.  1:24]:  et  est  Dei  Filius  profecto  Deus.  
Deum  habet  igitur  quisquis  beatus  est:  quod  omnibus  nobis  iam  ante  placuit,  cum  hoc  convivium  ingressi  
sumus.  Sed  quid  putatis  esse  sapientiam,  nisi  veritatem?  Etiam  hoc  enim  dictum  est:  Ego  sum  Veritas  [John  
14:6].   Veritas   autem   ut   sit,   fit   per   aliquem   summum  modum,   a   quo   procedit,   et   in   quem   se   perfecta  
convertit.  Ipsi  autem  summo  modo  nullus  alius  modus  imponitur:  si  enim  summus  modus  per  summum  
modum  modus  est,  per  seipsum  modus  est.  Sed  etiam  summus  modus  necesse  est  ut  verus  modus  sit.  Ut  
igitur   veritas   modo   gignitur,   ita   modus   veritate   cognoscitur.   Neque   igitur   veritas   sine   modo,   neque  
modus  sine  veritate  unquam  fuit.  Quis  est  Dei  Filius?  Dictum  est:  Veritas.  Quis  est  qui  non  habet  patrem,  
quis  alius  quam  summus  modus?  Quisquis  igitur  ad  summum  modum  per  veritatem  venerit,  beatus  est.  
Hoc   est   animo  Deum  habere,   id   est  Deo   perfrui.   Caetera   enim   quamvis   a  Deo   habeantur,   non   habent  
Deum”  (4.34).  
Also,   in  De  natura  boni  contra  Manichaeos,  which  was  begun  after  De  doctrina,  Augustine  utilizes  
this   phrase   summus   modus   to   describe   God,   suggesting   that   it   amounts   to   understanding   God   as   the  
summum  bonum,  “the  abovemost  good”:  “Deus  autem  nec  modum  habere  dicendus  est,  ne  finis  eius  dici  
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From  Cicero,  moreover,  Augustine  appropriates  a  “moral”  sense  of  measure,  insofar  as  
Cicero  not  only  connects  the  idea  of  measure  to  both  the  virtue  of  moderation  and  the  
seemliness   of   a   good   moral   life,26   but   also   says   that   our   ability   to   recognize   and  
implement  measure  in  words  and  deeds  distinguishes  us  from  other  animals.27  In  light  
of  these  influences,  I  contend  that  the  “modus  of  coming  upon  those  things  that  are  to  be  
understood”   in  Scripture   is  central   to  Augustine’s  modification  of  education,  and  that  
this  new  “measure  of  intelligibility”  is  understood  only  by  reflecting  on  the  coming  of  
Wisdom  itself  in  the  flesh.  In  other  words,  understanding  the  measure  that  Jesus  Christ  
himself   is   is   the   way   to   unlocking   the   ultimate   intelligibility   of   Scripture   and,   by  
extension,  all  of  reality.  In  what  follows  I  outline  how  we  should  understand  this  new  
                                                                                                                                                       
putetur.  Nec   ideo   tamen   immoderatus   est,   a  quo  modus  omnibus   tribuitur   rebus,  ut   aliquo  modo  esse  
possint.   Nec   rursus   moderatum   oportet   dici   Deum,   tamquam   ab   aliquo   modum   acceperit.   Si   autem  
dicamus  eum  summum  modum,   forte  aliquid  dicimus;  si   tamen   in  eo  quod  dicimus  summum  modum  
intellegamus   summum   bonum.   Omnis   enim   modus,   in   quantum   modus   est,   bonus   est.   Unde   omnia  
moderata,  modesta,  modificata,  dici  sine   laude  non  possunt;  quamquam  sub  alio   intellectu  modum  pro  
fine  ponamus,  et  nullum  modum  dicamus  ubi  nullus  est  finis.  Quod  aliquando  cum  laude  dicitur,  sicut  
dictum  est:  Et  regni  eius  non  erit   finis   [Luke  1:33].  Posset  enim  dici  etiam:  non  erit  modus,  ut  modus  pro  
fine  dictus  intellegeretur.  Nam  qui  nullo  modo  regnat,  non  utique  regnat”  (I.22).  
Consider  also  this  passage  from  Contra  Academicos,  one  of  the  Cassiciacum  dialogues  written  just  
prior   to   his   conversion:   “Postremo   quidquid   de   otio   meo   modo   gaudeo;   quod   a   superfluarum  
cupiditatum  vinculis  evolavi,  quod  depositis  oneribus  mortuarum  curarum,  respiro,  resipisco,  redeo  ad  
me;   quod   quaero   intentissimus   veritatem,   quod   invenire   iam   ingredior,   quod  me   ad   summum   ipsum  
modum  perventurum  esse  confido;  tu  animasti,  tu  impulisti,  tu  fecisti”  (I.2.4).  
26  For  these  connections,  see  especially  De  officiis  I.93  and  I.141-­‐‑42.  
Augustine  appears  to  connect   this  moral/aesthetic  sense  of  modus   to   the  divine   in  the  following  
passage:   “Nunc   ad   propositum   veniamus.   Iam   enim   sero   coepi   metuere,   ne   hoc   principium   modum  
excederet,   et   non   est   leve.  Nam  modus   procul   dubio   divinus   est:   sed   fefellerit   cum  dulciter   ducit,   ero  
cautior  cum  sapiens  fuero”  (Contra  Academicos,  II.3.9).  
27  “Nec  vero   illa  parva  vis  naturae  est  rationisque,  quod  unum  hoc  animal  sentit,  quid  sit  ordo,  
quid   sit   quod   deceat,   in   factis   dictisque   qui   modus.   Itaque   eorum   ipsorum,   quae   aspectu   sentiuntur,  
nullum   aliud   animal   pulchritudinem,   venustatem,   convenientiam   partium   sentit;   quam   similitudinem  
natura   ratioque   ab   oculis   ad   animum   transferens   multo   etiam   magis   pulchritudinem,   constantiam,  
ordinem  in  consiliis  factisque  conservandam  putat  cavetque  ne  quid  indecore  effeminateve  faciat,  tum  in  
omnibus   et   opinionibus   et   factis   ne   quid   libidinose   aut   faciat   aut   cogitet.  Quibus   ex   rebus   conflatur   et  
efficitur  id,  quod  quaerimus,  honestum,  quod  etiamsi  nobilitatum  non  sit,  tamen  honestum  sit,  quodque  
vere  dicimus,  etiamsi  a  nullo  laudetur,  natura  esse  laudabile”  (De  officiis,  I.14).  
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measure   of   intelligibility   by   considering   Augustine’s   discussion   of   res   or   realities   in  
Book  I.  
   In   Book   I   of  De   doctrina,   Augustine   shows   us   how   to   “take   measure”   of   the  
realities  we  encounter  in  accordance  with  the  God  of  Jesus  Christ—or,  perhaps  better,  in  
accordance  with  the  God  that  is  Jesus  Christ.  Christ,  then,  is  the  interpretive  key  to  our  
“coming  upon  the  things  to  be  understood”  in  Scripture.  Moreover,  given  the  status  of  
Scripture  in  relation  to  all  learning,  as  articulated  in  the  section  I  above,  one  can  also  say  
that  Christ  uncovers  the  ultimate  intelligibility  and  value  of  every  reality.  But,  one  may  
ask,   Quomodo?   How?   Or,   more   precisely:   By   what   measure?   Book   I   explains   it   by  
showing   how   the   God   of   Jesus   Christ   operates   “ontologically”   or   “really”   as   the  
measure   of   the   intelligibility   of   realities   and,   in   addition,   how  we   conform   ourselves  
“morally”  to  this  real  measure  through  charity.  
   Augustine   begins   his   explanation   by   introducing   the   most   fundamental  
distinctions  among  realities:  
There  are  some  realities,  then,  that  are  to  be  enjoyed,  some  that  are  to  be  
used,   some   that   enjoy   and   use.   Those   that   are   to   be   enjoyed   make   us  
blessed.   By   those   that   are   to   be   used,   we   who   are   tending   toward  
blessedness  are  helped  and,  as  it  were,  propped  up,  so  that  we  are  able  to  
arrive  at  those  realities  that  make  us  blessed  and  adhere  to  them.  Now  we  
who  enjoy  and  use,  who  are  constituted  between  both,  if  we  will  to  enjoy  
those  things  that  are  to  be  used,  our  course  is  impeded  and  at  times  even  
bent  down,  so  that  we,  shackled  by  the  love  of  lower  things,  are  held  back  
or  called  back  from  obtaining  those  things  that  are  to  be  enjoyed.28  
                                                
28   “Res   ergo   aliae   sunt   quibus   fruendum   est,   aliae   quibus   utendum,   aliae   quae   fruuntur   et  
utuntur.   Illae   quibus   fruendum   est,   beatos   nos   faciunt.   Istis   quibus   utendum   est,   tendentes   ad  
beatitudinem  adjuvamur,   et  quasi  adminiculamur,  ut  ad   illas  quae  nos  beatos   faciunt,  pervenire,   atque  
his  inhaerere  possimus.  Nos  vero  qui  fruimur  et  utimur,  inter  utrasque  constituti,  si  eis  quibus  utendum  
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For   Augustine,   then,   realities   are   distinguished   first   and   foremost   in   terms   of   their  
relation   to   us   human   beings   as   “tending   toward   blessedness.”   In   light   of   the   human  
orientation  toward  blessedness,  a  reality  can  stand  either  as  an  end  or  a  means,  i.e.,  as  
to-­‐‑be-­‐‑enjoyed   (fruendum)   or   to-­‐‑be-­‐‑used   (utendum).  We   human   beings   “are   constituted  
between  both”  types  of  reality.  Now,  it  becomes  clear  later  in  Book  I  that  human  beings  
stand  toward  each  other  ultimately  as  to-­‐‑be-­‐‑used.  Hence,  the  primary  distinction  among  
realities  is  between  those-­‐‑to-­‐‑be-­‐‑enjoyed  and  those-­‐‑to-­‐‑be-­‐‑used,  although  this  distinction  
makes  sense  only  in  light  of  the  presence  of  human  beings  as  realities  who  are  capable  
of  enjoying  or  using  them.  
   A  couple  of  points  are  worth  noting  here.  The  first  is  that  the  primary  distinction  
is  not  among  “goods”  or  of  “objects  of  choice,”  but  realities.  In  other  words,  it  is  first  and  
foremost  an  ontological  or  metaphysical  distinction.  I  emphasize  this  because  the  reader  of  
De  doctrina  may  be  tempted  to  think  that  Augustine  is  making  a  moral  distinction  at  this  
point,  insofar  as  he  relates  realities  primarily  to  human  beings  as  agents  able  to  choose  
which  goods  to  pursue  or  love.  To  be  sure,  there  is  some  truth  in  reading  this  distinction  
along  “moral”   lines,  and  yet  such  a  reading  fails   to  uncover   the  depth  and  novelty  of  
what   Augustine   is   doing   here.   For   by   means   of   these   fundamental   distinctions,  
Augustine   lays   the   groundwork   for   an   ontology   or   metaphysics   in   which   the   very  
intelligibility  of  realities  simply  as  realities  is  rooted  in  their  relation  to  human  beings  as  
able   to   enjoy   them   or   to   use   them.   In   other   words,   the   very  meaning   of   any   reality  
revolves  around  the  human  being  as  “tending  toward  blessedness,”  and  thus  what  each  
reality  ultimately  is  is  brought  to  light  by  seeing  it  in  relation  to  the  human  being.  The  
reason  for  this  is  that  realities  were  created  for  the  human  being;  such  was  the  Creator’s  
intention  behind  their  existing  at  all.  Hence,   the  world  makes  no  sense  apart  from  the  
                                                                                                                                                       
est   frui   voluerimus,   impeditur   cursus   noster,   et   aliquando   etiam   deflectitur,   ut   ab   his   rebus   quibus  
fruendum  est  obtinendis  vel  retardemur,  vel  revocemur,  inferiorum  amore  praepediti”  (DDC,  I.3.3).  
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human   intentionality   toward   blessedness.   The   human   being,   therefore,   becomes   the  
focal  point  of  the  meaningfulness  of  every  reality.  I  should  add,  moreover,  that  unless  
one  recognizes   this,  one   fails   to  grasp  how  Jesus  Christ  as   the  God-­‐‑man  who  came  to  
save  human  beings  stands  as  the  interpretive  key  that  unlocks  not  only  the  intelligibility  
of  all  morality,  but  also—and  primarily—the  intelligibility  of  all  reality.29  
   A   second,   but   connected   point   has   to   do   with   the   grammar   that   Augustine  
employs   in   this   passage.   He   uses   a   future-­‐‑oriented   grammatical   device,   the   passive  
paraphrastic,   to  make  his  division  of   realities   into   those-­‐‑to-­‐‑be-­‐‑enjoyed   (fruendum)   and  
those-­‐‑to-­‐‑be-­‐‑used   (utendum).   Earlier   in  De   doctrina   Augustine   speaks   of   “things   to   be  
understood”   (intellegenda)   in   Scripture,   thus   suggesting   that   Scripture   is   full   of  
intelligibilities   waiting   to   be   unearthed   by   attentive   and   well-­‐‑disposed   readers;   the  
reader   of   Scripture,   then,   should   be   attracted   to   it   in   accordance   with   its   latent  
intelligibility.  Here  we  see  that  realities  themselves  stand  in  waiting,  so  to  speak,  to  be  
used   or   to   be   enjoyed.   Realities   should   be   understood,   then,   in   terms   of   their   latent  
potentiality   in   relation   to   our   wills   and   our   choosing;   for   realities   are   usable   or  
enjoyable  in  light  of  the  deepest  orientation  of  human  beings  toward  blessedness.  One  
might   say,   then,   that  Augustine  both  “magnetizes”  and  “historicizes”   every   reality   in  
relation   to   the   possible   future   condition   of   human   blessedness.   In   the   present,  
everything  that  we  encounter  is  to  be  understood  in  relation  to  us  human  beings  who  
are  not-­‐‑yet-­‐‑there  in  terms  of  blessedness,  i.e.,  who  are  in  via,  exiles  from  the  fatherland  
who  are  nonetheless  on  their  way  back.  Every  reality,  then,  is  good  and  attractive,  and  it  
attractiveness  must   be   understood   in   light   of   its   ability   either   to   help   us   on   the  way  
toward  blessedness  or  to  be  that  in  which  we  find  our  blessedness.  Consequently,  every  
reality   is  able  to  elicit  a  choice  from  us,  namely,   to  deal  with  it   in  such  a  way  that  we  
                                                
29   Along   these   lines,   see   M.   Jordan,   ““Words   and   Word:   Incarnation   and   Signification   in  
Augustine’s  De  doctrina  Christiana,”  Augustinian  Studies  11  (1980):  177-­‐‑96.  
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bear  it  back  toward  what  we  love  as  something  to  be  obtained  or  to  deal  with  it  in  such  
a  way  that  we  adhere  to  it  with  love  on  account  of  itself.30  
   This   foundational   ontological   distinction   between   realities   to   be   enjoyed   and  
those  to  be  used  articulates  their  ultimate  intelligibility  in  relation  to  the  human  being’s  
underlying   intentionality   toward   blessedness.   In   other   words,   it   reveals   the  
intelligibility   of   realities   from   the   perspective   of   self-­‐‑aware,   free   creatures,   i.e.,   we  
realities  who  “enjoy  and  use.”31  The  next  logical  question,  then,  is  this:  Which  reality  is  
to   be   enjoyed?  Which   reality   stands   as   the   ultimate   attractor,   the   ultimate   reality   in  
                                                
30   These   last   two   alternatives   are   based   on   the   way   Augustine   defines   uti   (“using”)   and   frui  
(“enjoying”)  at  DDC,  I.4.4:  “Frui  enim  est  amore  alicui  rei  inhaerere  propter  seipsam.  Uti  autem,  quod  in  
usum  venerit  ad  id  quod  amas  obtinendum  referre,  si  tamen  amandum  est.”  
31  The  “flip-­‐‑side”  of  this  created  perspective  is  the  Creator’s  perspective.  And,  in  fact,  Augustine  
grants   us   a   glimpse   of   this   perspective   later   in   Book   I  when   he  wonders   about  God’s   use   of   realities.  
Indeed,  seeing  the  intelligibility  of  realities  from  the  other  (divine)  end,  so  to  speak,  helps  us  understand  
better  their  intelligibility  in  relation  to  us.  This  is  what  Augustine  says:  “Sed  neque  sic  utitur  ut  nos:  nam  
nos  res  quibus  utimur  ad  id  referimus,  ut  Dei  bonitate  perfruamur;  Deus  vero  ad  suam  bonitatem  usum  
nostrum  refert.  Quia  enim  bonus  est,  sumus;  et  in  quantum  sumus,  boni  sumus.  Porro  autem  quia  etiam  
iustus  est,  non  impune  mali  sumus;  et  in  quantum  mali  sumus,  in  tantum  etiam  minus  sumus.  Ille  enim  
summe  ac  primitus  est,  qui  omnino  incommutabilis  est,  et  qui  plenissime  dicere  potuit:  Ego  sum  qui  sum,  
et:  Dices  eis:  Qui  est  misit  me  ad  vos.  Ut  cetera  quae  sunt,  et  nisi  ab  illo  esse  non  possint,  et  in  tantum  bona  
sint,  in  quantum  acceperunt  ut  sint.  Ille  igitur  usus  qui  dicitur  Dei,  quo  nobis  utitur,  non  ad  ejus,  sed  ad  
nostram  utilitatem   refertur,   ad   ejus   autem   tantummodo  bonitatem.  Cujus   autem  nos  miseremur,   et   cui  
consulimus,  ad  ejus  quidem  utilitatem  id  facimus,  eamque  intuemur;  sed  nescio  quomodo  etiam  nostra  fit  
consequens,  cum  eam  misericordiam  quam  impendimus  egenti,  sine  mercede  non  relinquit  Deus.  Haec  
autem  merces   summa   est   ut   ipso   perfruamur,   et   omnes   qui   eo   fruimur,   nobis   etiam   invicem   in   ipso  
perfruamur”   (DDC,   I.32.35).   [“But  God  does   not   use   as  we   use.   For  we   bear   back   the   realities  we   use  
toward   him   so   that  we  may   thoroughly   enjoy   the   goodness   of  God,  whereas  God   bears   back   our   use  
toward  his  goodness.  For  because  he  is  good,  we  exist,  and  inasmuch  as  we  exist,  we  are  good.  But  also,  
because  he  is  just  as  well,  we  are  not  evil  without  consequence;  and  to  the  extent  that  we  are  evil,  to  that  
same   extent  we   are   in   a   less  way.   For   he   is   in   the   abovemost   and   primary  way,   he  who   is   altogether  
unchangeable  and  who  was  able  to  say  most  fully,  “I  am  who  am,”  and,  “Say  to  them:  ‘He  who  is  sent  me  
to  you’”  [Exodus  3:14].  And  so  the  rest  of  the  things  that  are,  are  not  able  to  be  except  from  him,  and  to  the  
extent  that  they  have  received  so  that  they  may  be,  to  that  extent  they  are  good.  That  use,  therefore,  which  
is   said   to  be  God’s,  whereby  he  uses  us,   is   borne  back  not   toward  his,   but   toward  our  usefulness,   but  
toward  his  goodness  only.  But  regarding  the  one  whom  we  pity  and  care  for,  we  indeed  do  it  and  regard  
it   as   for   his   usefulness;   but   I   know   not   in   what   manner   our   own   usefulness   also   comes   about   as   a  
consequence,  when  God  does  not  leave  without  reward  that  pity-­‐‑heartedness  which  we  expend  on  one  in  
need.  Now  this  is  the  highest  reward:  that  we  thoroughly  enjoy  him  and  that  all  of  us  who  enjoy  him  also  
thoroughly  enjoy  each  other  in  him.”]  
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whom   human   blessedness   consists?   Augustine   answers   this   question,   in   fact,  
immediately  after  he  articulates  his  foundational  distinction  among  realities.  He  says:  
The  realities,   therefore,   that  are  to  be  enjoyed  are  the  Father  and  the  Son  
and  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  the  same  Threeness,  a  single  abovemost  reality,  
and   something   common   to   all   those   who   enjoy   it—whether   it   be   not   a  
reality,   but   the   cause  of   all   realities,   or   both   a   reality   and  a   cause.   For   a  
name   that   befits   such   excellingness   is   not   able   to   be   come   upon   easily,  
unless  it  is  better  said  that  this  Threeness  is  the  one  God  from  whom  are  
all  things,  through  whom  are  all  things,  in  whom  are  all  things.32  
At  the  furthest  end  of  human  striving  toward  blessedness  stands  the  three-­‐‑in-­‐‑one  God,  
who   alone   is   to   be   enjoyed.   The   attractiveness   of   this   common   and   communal  
Trinitarian   reality   stretches   back   to   all   other   realities   and   catches   them   up   into   its  
attraction,  thereby  making  all  of  them  realities  to  be  used.  
   Because  God  stands  as  that  in  light  of  which  and  toward  which  we  choose  what  
we   choose,   it   is   helpful   to   understand   (as   much   as   we   are   able)   the   “mode”   or  
“measure”  of  this  divine  reality.  In  what  manner  does  it  exist?  Is  there  a  way  for  us  to  
“measure  up”  this  reality  in  our  minds?  A  few  aspects  of  divine  existence  are  hinted  at  
in   this   passage.   First,   this   single   abovemost   reality   is   an   interpersonal   “Threeness,”  
Father   and   Son   and   Holy   Spirit,   who   can   be   enjoyed   in   common   by   realities   like  
ourselves  who  enjoy  and  use.  This  single,  triune  reality,  therefore,  is  the  grounds  for  a  
possible   future   human   community   marked   by   blessedness.   In   addition,   this   passage  
indicates   that   this   abovemost   reality   is   in   some   sense   a   reality,   but   is   perhaps   better  
understand  as  a  reality  beyond  all  realities  as  their  cause.  Augustine  suggests,  in  other  
                                                
   32   “Res   igitur   quibus   fruendum   est,   Pater   et   Filius   et   Spiritus   Sanctus,   eademque   Trinitas,   una  
quaedam  summa  res,  communisque  omnibus  fruentibus  ea;  si  tamen  res  et  non  rerum  omnium  causa,  si  
tamen   et   causa.   Non   enim   facile   nomen   quod   tantae   excellentiae   conveniat,   inveniri   potest,   nisi   quod  
melius  ita  dicitur  Trinitas  haec,  unus  Deus  ex  quo  omnia,  per  quem  omnia,  in  quo  omnia”  (DDC,  I.5.5).  
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words,  that  God  exists  among  realities  while  simultaneously  transcending  them  as  their  
source,  i.e.,  as  the  one  from,  through,  and  in  whom  all  things  are.  In  light  of  these  first  
two  points,  a  third  one  suggested  by  Augustine  is  unsurprising,  namely,  that  this  divine  
reality  has  an  “excelling”  manner  of  existence   that  makes   it  difficult   to  speak  fittingly  
about  it.  
   This   last   aspect   of   the   divine   reality   as   “inexpressibly   excelling,”   moreover,  
becomes  thematic  in  the  ensuing  chapters.  “Do  we  say  something  or  sound  something  
worthy  of  God?”  Augustine  asks.  He  answers  himself  thus:  
I   perceive,   rather,   that   I   have   done   nothing   other   than   to   will   to   say  
something;  but  if  I  have  said  something,  I  did  not  say  what  I  willed  to  say.  
Whence   do   I   know   this   except   because   God   is   inexpressible?   But   that  
which  has  been  said  by  me,  if  God  is  inexpressible,  would  not  have  been  
said.  And  by   this   fact  God   is  not   to  be   said   to  be   inexpressible,   because  
when  this  is  said,  something  is  said.  And  there  comes  about  by  I  know  not  
what  conflict  of  words  that  if  the  inexpressible  is  that  which  is  not  able  to  
be   said,   then   what   can   be   said   to   be   inexpressible   is   not   indeed  
inexpressible.  This  conflict  of  words  is  to  be  avoided  by  silence  rather  than  
smoothed   over   by   vocal-­‐‑sound.   And   yet   God,   although   nothing   can   be  
said  of  him  worthily,  has  permitted  the  service  of  human  vocal-­‐‑sound  and  
has  willed   that  by  our  words  we   rejoice   in  praise  of  him.  For   thus  he   is  
and  is  said  to  be  Deus.  For  truly  in  the  noise  of  these  two  syllables  he  is  not  
known;   rather,  when   this   sound   touches   the  ears  of  all   those  who  know  
the  Latin  tongue,  it  moves  them  toward  thinking  some  most  excelling  and  
immortal  nature.33  
                                                
33   “Diximusne   aliquid   et   sonuimus   aliquid  dignum  Deo?   Imo  vero  nihil  me   aliud  quam  dicere  
voluisse  sentio:  si  autem  dixi,  non  hoc  est  quod  dicere  volui.  Hoc  unde  scio,  nisi  quia  Deus  ineffabilis  est?  
Matthew  D.  WALZ        
  
ARTS  OF  LIBERTY  1:1                                                     SUMMER  2013  
 
75
God  as  the  threefold,  single,  ever-­‐‑excelling  reality  who  is  the  cause  of  all  realities;  God  
as   the  sole  reality   to  be  enjoyed,   in  relation  to  which  all  other  realities  are   to  be  used;  
God  as  the  ineffably  ineffable  reality  who  stands  at  the  extremity  of  our  willing  to  think:  
such   is   the   “measure”   whereby   we   strive   to   articulate   the   reality   of   that   which   lies  
below  and  stands  beyond  all  realities  as   the  source  and  end  of   their   intelligibility  and  
choosability.  
It  may  be  helpful  to  think  of  this  account  of  God  as  Augustine’s  articulating  the  
abovemost  reality  in  a  way  that  tallies  with  the  restless,  all-­‐‑too-­‐‑human  heart  in  both  its  
intellectual  and  volitional  dimensions.  The  divine  reality  stands  as  the  ultimate  object  of  
the   eros   that   permeates   all   things,   and   especially   the   eros   of   the   human   heart   that   is  
always  capable  of  extending  its  thinking  and  willing  beyond  the  finitude  of  any  given  
reality.  Hence,  in  one  of  his  “Anselmian”  moments,  Augustine  asserts:  
For  when  that  one  God  of  gods  is  thought  by  those  even  who  suppose  and  
call  on  and  worship  other  gods  either  in  heaven  or  on  earth,  he  is  thought  
in  such  a  way  that  that  thought  endeavors  to  touch  upon  something  than  
which  there  is  nothing  better  and  more  sublime.  .  .  .  Those,  however,  who  
proceed   to   see   what   that   God   is   through   intelligence   prefer   him   to   all  
changeable  things,  to  all  visible  and  bodily  natures  and  even  to  intelligible  
and   spiritual   natures.   But   all   struggle   earnestly   for   the   excellingness   of  
God,  nor   can   there  be   found  anyone  who  believes   that  God   is   that   than  
which  something  is  better.  And  thus  all  perceive  together  that  God  is  that  
                                                                                                                                                       
Quod   autem   a   me   dictum   est,   si   ineffabile   esset,   dictum   non   esset.   Ac   per   hoc   ne   ineffabilis   quidem  
dicendus  est  Deus,  quia  et  hoc  cum  dicitur,  aliquid  dicitur.  Et  fit  nescio  qua  pugna  verborum,  quoniam  si  
illud   est   ineffabile   quod  dici   non  potest,   non   est   ineffabile   quod  vel   ineffabile  dici   potest.  Quae  pugna  
verborum  silentio   cavenda  potius  quam  voce  pacanda   est.  Et   tamen  Deus,   cum  de   illo  nihil  digne  dici  
possit,  admisit  humanae  vocis  obsequium,  et  verbis  nostris  in  laude  sua  gaudere  nos  voluit.  Nam  inde  est  
et   dicitur  Deus.  Non   enim   revera   in   strepitu   istarum   duarum   syllabarum   ipse   cognoscitur;   sed   tamen  
omnes  latinae  linguae  scios,  cum  aures  eorum  sonus  iste  tetigerit,  movet  ad  cogitandum  excellentissimam  
quamdam  immortalemque  naturam”  (DDC,  I.6.6).  
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which  they  put  before  all  other  things.34  
This   description   of   God   appears   to   correspond   with   a   Neoplatonic   account   of   the  
highest  divinity  as  the  One  beyond  Being  who  is  likewise  the  Good  from  whom  all  the  
realities   of   our   experience   emanate.   Having   come   forth   from   the   Good,   emanated  
realities   are   “eroticized”   or   desiderative   in   their   relation   to   it,   which   is   particularly  
apparent  in  realities  like  ourselves  who  participate  in  intelligence  and  freedom  and  who  
are  able  self-­‐‑consciously  to  get  out  of  ourselves  and  strive  for  that  which  is  higher  and  
transcendent.  It  appears,  then,  that  Augustine,  like  Plotinus,  is  articulating  a  measure  of  
realities   that   is   itself   unmeasured.35   Indeed,   God   is   the   One   that   renders   all   realities  
intelligible,   the  Good  that   renders  all   realities  attractive—and  perhaps  even  ensnaring  
in  their  very  attractiveness.  
   In  the  ensuing  chapters,  moreover,  Augustine  depicts  a  “hierarchy  of  being”  that  
also  appears  to  fill  out  a  Neoplatonic  conception  of  the  whole  of  reality.  This  hierarchy  
spans   the  bodily,   the   living,   the   sentient,   the   intelligent,   the  wise,   and  Wisdom   itself,  
which  by   its  very  unchangeability   is   capable  of  bringing  changeable,  wisdom-­‐‑seeking  
human  intelligence  to  rest.  Human  striving  for  that  abovemost  reality  which  alone  is  to  
be  enjoyed  turns  out,  therefore,  to  be  philosophia,  the  pursuit  and  love  of  Wisdom  itself.  
And  to  reach  it,  Augustine  indicates,  requires  both  a  cleansing  and  serious  effort  on  our  
part:  
On   account   of   this,   since   that   truth   which   lives   unchangeably   is   to   be  
thoroughly   enjoyed,   and   in   that   truth   God   the   Trinity,   the   author   and  
                                                
34  “Nam  cum  ille  unus  cogitatur  deorum  Deus,  ab  his  etiam  qui  alios  et  suspicantur  et  vocant  et  
colunt  deos   sive   in   coelo   sive   in   terra,   ita   cogitatur,  ut   aliquid  quo  nihil  melius   sit   atque   sublimius   illa  
cogitatio  conetur  attingere.  .  .  .  Illa  autem  qui  per  intelligentiam  pergunt  videre  quod  Deus  est,  omnibus  
eum   naturis   visibilibus   et   corporalibus,   intelligibilibus   etiam   et   spiritalualibus,   omnibus   mutabilibus  
praeferunt.  Omnes   tamen   certatim   pro   excellentia  Dei   dimicant;   nec   quisquam   inveniri   potest   qui   hoc  
Deum  credat  esse  quo  melius  aliquid  est.  Itaque  hoc  omnes  Deum  consentiunt  esse,  quod  caeteris  rebus  
omnibus  anteponunt”  (DDC,  I.7.7).  
35  See  note  24  above.  
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establisher   of   the   universe,   establishes   for   realities   the   things   he   has  
decided  on,  the  soul  is  to  be  cleansed  so  that  it  may  avail  to  see  thoroughly  
that   light   and   adhere   to   what   it   has   seen   thoroughly.   We   deem   this  
cleansing  to  be,  as  it  were,  a  certain  walking  and,  as  it  were,  a  voyaging  to  
our   fatherland.   For  we   do   not  move   through   places   toward   one  who   is  
present   everywhere;   we   move   toward   him,   rather,   by   good   effort   and  
good  mores.36  
No  one  is  more  aware  than  Augustine  that  this  cleansing  voyage,  which  requires  good  
effort  and  good  living  on  our  part,   is  difficult—indeed,   impossible—to  achieve  by  our  
own  strength.  And  yet  we  must  undergo  this  deep  cleansing  if  we  ever  hope  to  be  well-­‐‑
adjusted   intellectually  and  volitionally   to   the   realities   that   surround  us   in  via   so  as   to  
evaluate  them  rightly  as  we  make  our  way  toward  Wisdom  itself.  This  is  a  dilemma,  an  
aporia,  an   impasse   in  our   journey:   the  restless  human  heart  on   it  own  cannot  arrive  at  
that  for  which  it  strives.  
   If  Augustine’s  account  of  God  as  the  abovemost  reality  and  the  human  striving  
for  that  reality  mirrors  the  account  of  the  Platonici,  then  we  should  be  grateful  for  how  
far  these  “Egyptians”  have  led  us.  Yet  if  Augustine’s  restless  heart  reflects  in  some  way  
the  experience  of  Everyman,   then   the  Platonici  bring  us   to  an   impasse,   through  which  
they   know   not   the   way.   At   this   point   in   Book   I,   therefore,   we   can   stand   back   and  
witness  Augustine  himself  as  he  purifies   that  gold  ore  which  he  has  dug  up  from  the  
mines   of   divine   providence.   And   he   purifies   it,   surprisingly,   by   “sullying”   it   with  
human  flesh.  “We  are  not  capable  of  [good  effort  and  good  mores],”  Augustine  says,  
except   that  Wisdom   itself   deemed   it   worthy   to   come   together  with   our  
                                                
36   “Quapropter,   cum   illa   veritate   perfruendum   sit   quae   incommutabiliter   vivit,   et   in   ea   trinitas  
Deus,   auctor   et   conditor   universitatis,   rebus   quas   condidit   consulat,   purgandus   est   animus,   ut   et  
perspicere  illam  lucem  valeat  et  inherere  perspectae.  Quam  purgationem  quasi  ambulationem  quamdam  
et   quasi   navigationem   ad   patriam   esse   arbitremur.   Non   enim   ad   eum   qui   ubique   praesens   est   locis  
movemur,  sed  bono  studio  bonisque  moribus”  (DDC,  I.10.10).  
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weakness  and  to  provide  an  example  of  living  for  us,  not  otherwise  than  
in   a  man,   because  we   too   are  men.  But  because  we  act  wisely  when  we  
come  toward  that  Wisdom,  Wisdom  itself  was  reputed  by  arrogant  men  to  
have   acted   foolishly  when   it   came   to   us.  And  because  we   gain   strength  
when  we  come  toward  that  Wisdom,  Wisdom  itself  is  deemed  weak,  as  it  
were,  when  it  comes  to  us.  But  “that  which  is  foolish  for  God  is  wiser  to  
men,   and   that  which   is  weak   for  God   is   stronger   to  men”   [I   Corinthians  
1:25].   Since,   therefore,  Wisdom   itself   is   the   fatherland,   it   has   also  made  
itself  the  way  to  the  fatherland  for  us.37  
Human   ascension   to   the   divine   requires   divine   condescension   to   the   human.   Thus  
Wisdom   itself,   that   ultimate   theoretical   end   of   the   philosophers,   foolishly   insinuates  
itself  into  the  physical  world  as  the  very  practical  Wisdom  necessary  for  human  beings  
to  attain  their  end.  Here,  then,  by  asserting  that  the  end  has  become  also  the  means—or,  
in   Augustine’s   terms,   the   sole   reality   to   be   enjoyed   has   also   become   a   reality   to   be  
used—Augustine  initiates  a  modification  of  our  understanding  of  the  abovemost  reality  
that  measures  all  things.  And,  as  this  passage  suggests,  to  the  eyes  of  us  all-­‐‑too-­‐‑human  
beings,  such  a  modification  appears  foolish.  
   Speaking   for  myself,   I  know  that   I  am  not  as   true  a   lover  of  Wisdom  itself  as   I  
ought   to   be.   Hence   my   restless   heart’s   intellectual   and   volitional   encounters   with  
realities  demand  modification  and  correction  in  order  to  live  up  to  even  the  seemingly  
Neoplatonic  conception  of   the  whole  of   reality   that  Augustine  had   laid  out  up   to   this  
point.  In  other  words,  despite  the  fact  that  I  am  a  professor  of  philosophy—or  perhaps  
                                                
37  “Quod  non  possumus,  nisi  ipsa  Sapientia  tantae  etiam  nostrae  infirmitati  congruere  dignaretur  
et  vivendi  nobis  praeberet  exemplum,  non  aliter  quam  in  homine,  quoniam  et  nos  homines  sumus.  Sed  
quia  nos  cum  ad  illam  venimus,  sapienter  facimus;  ipsa  cum  ad  nos  venit,  ab  hominibus  superbis  quasi  
stulte   fecisse  putata  est.  Et  quoniam  nos  cum  ad   illam  venimus,  convalescimus;   ipsa  cum  ad  nos  venit,  
quasi   infirma   existimata   est.   Sed   quod   stultum   est  Dei,   sapientius   est   hominibus,   et   quod   infirmum   est  Dei,  
fortius  est  hominibus  [I  Cor.  I:25].  Cum  ergo  ipsa  sit  patria,  viam  se  quoque  nobis  fecit  ad  patriam”  (DDC,  
I.11.11).  
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precisely  because  I  am  a  professor  of  philosophy!—I  fail  to  be  as  philosophic  as  I  ought  
to  be;  in  other  words,  I  fail  to  love  wisdom  as  I  ought.  Hence  I  fail  to  take  measure  of  
other   realities   in   light  of   that  Wisdom   itself  which   is   to  be   enjoyed  and  which  makes  
realities   intelligible   and   choices  meaningful.  What  Augustine   is  doing  at   this  point   in  
Book   I   both   hurts   and   helps   me.   It   hurts   me   inasmuch   as   it   adds   a   new,   deeper  
dimension  to  that  Wisdom  itself  which  I  struggle  to  “put  before  all  other  things.”  Yet  it  
helps  me  inasmuch  as  it  certifies  my  struggle  and  provides  a  way  out  for  me,  namely,  if  
I  assent  to  the  fact  that  Wisdom  itself  joined  itself  to  my  weakness  in  order  to  exemplify  
a  path  toward  itself.  My  restless  heart,  it  seems,  shouldn’t  be  anything  but  exhilarated  
by   such   a   gracious   proposal;   why,   then,   does   it   in   its   thinking   and   willing   tend   to  
dismiss   it   as   foolish?  This  mystery  of  divine   charity   that   baffles  me   is,   I   don’t  doubt,  
repelled  by  the  mystery  of  iniquity  that  dwells  in  me.  
   Augustine,   though,   continues,   seeking   to   make   the   proposal   of   divine  
condescension   intelligible   to   us   and   hoping,   it   appears,   to   facilitate   our   assent   to   it.  
Quomodo  venit?  he  asks.  In  what  manner  did  Wisdom  itself  come?  By  what  measure  can  
we  render  such  divine  foolishness  understandable?  Augustine’s  subtle  answer  provides  
a   model   so   ready-­‐‑to-­‐‑hand   that   we   may   feel   foolish   indeed   for   overlooking   it  
meaningfulness:  
In   what   manner   did   [Wisdom]   come   except   that   “the  Word   was   made  
flesh   and   dwelt   among   us”   [John   1:14]?   It   is   just   as   when  we   speak:   in  
order  that  what  we  bear  in  our  soul  flows  into  the  soul  of  the  one  hearing  
through   fleshly   ears,   that   word   which   we   bear   in   our   heart   becomes   a  
sound,  and  it  is  called  speaking.  Our  thought,  however,  is  not  turned  into  
that  same  sound;  rather,  remaining  integral  with  respect  to  itself,   it  takes  
on  the  form  of  a  vocal-­‐‑sound  whereby  it  works   itself   into  ears  without  a  
defect  from  its  being  changed.  So  also  the  Word  of  God,  not  changed,  was  
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nonetheless  made  flesh  so  that  he  might  dwell  among  us.38  
Wisdom   itself—or   the   Word,   the   Logos,   its   Scriptural   name—became   flesh   after   the  
manner   of   thought’s   becoming   sound.  Now,  we  know   that   a   “descent”   of   intelligible  
content  into  the  realm  of  sensible  sound  takes  place;  it  happens  all  the  time.  For  when  
the  voice  of  my  fellow  human  being  hits  my  ears,  its  intelligibility  registers  immediately  
in  my  mind.  Yet  such  “descent”  in  no  way  compromises  the  integrity  of  the  intelligible  
content.  Rather,  the  speaker  retains  it  in  his  own  mind  even  as  it  is  being  diffused  into  
the  minds  of  others.  
   Allow  me   to   go   further  with   this   comparison.   In   the   act   of   speaking,   sound   is  
“anointed,”  I  daresay,  by  intelligibility,  and  this  “anointing”  is  able  to  bring  the  mind  of  
the  hearer  to  a  completion,  at  least  with  respect  to  what  is  being  communicated  in  that  
act  of  speaking.  It  fills  us  something  that  is  lacking  in  the  hearer.  The  act  of  speaking  is,  
as   it   were,   “anointed   sound   that   saves.”   In   other   words,   speech   manifests   a   “Jesu-­‐‑
Christo-­‐‑logical”   configuration,39   and   such   a   configuration   addresses   the   Quomodo?  
question;  in  other  word,  this  Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logical  configuration  is  the  modus  according  to  
which  we  should  understand  the  existence  of  the  abovemost  reality  in  its  relation  to  us  
human  beings  who  are  both  ill  and  yet  striving  for  blessedness.  The  abovemost  reality,  
in   other   words,   is   the   Wisdom   itself,   the   Word,   that   stands   at   the   extremity   of   our  
heart’s  thinking  and  longing  as  the  sole  reality  to  be  enjoyed;  simultaneously,  this  same  
abovemost   reality   anoints   humanity   by   its   divinity   in   order   to   assist   us   exiles   as  we  
journey   in   via   toward   the   enjoyment   of  Wisdom   itself   in   our   patria.   The   patria,  while  
remaining  integrally  the  patria,  becomes  also  the  via  to  the  patria.  
                                                
38   “Quomodo  venit,  nisi  quod  Verbum  caro   factum  est,   et   habitavit   in  nobis   [John  1:14]?  Sicut   cum  
loquimur,  ut  id  quod  animo  gerimus,  in  audientis  animum  per  aureas  carneas  illabatur,  fit  sonus  verbum  
quod  corde  gestamus,  et   locutio  vocatur;  nec   tamen   in  eundem  sonum  cogitatio  nostra  convertitur,   sed  
apud  se  manens  integra,  formam  vocis  qua  se  insinuet  auribus,  sine  aliqua  labe  suae  mutationis  assumit:  
ita  Verbum  Dei  non  commutatum,  caro  tamen  factum  est,  ut  habitaret  in  nobis”  (DDC,  I.13.12).  
39  “Jesus,”  of  course,  means  “savior”  or  “one  who  saves,”  while  “Christ”  means  “anointed.”  
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   What  follows  in  the  next  few  chapters  of  Book  I  is  a  narrative  that  evidences  just  
how  practically  wise  Wisdom-­‐‑itself-­‐‑made-­‐‑flesh  is  in  carrying  out  its  salvific  task  on  our  
behalf.  Wisdom  itself  comes  down  in  order  to  heal  us,  so  that  we  may  be  strong  enough  
to   enjoy   that  Wisdom.   In   so   doing,  moreover,  Wisdom   exercises   a   deft   touch   that   is  
“accommodated   to   our   wounds.”40   Within   this   medical   motif   we   again   find   a   Jesu-­‐‑
Christo-­‐‑logical  configuration;  for,  Augustine  says,  “the  wisdom  of  God  that  cures  man  
manifests   itself   in   order   to  heal,   being  himself   the  physician,   himself   the  medicine.”41  
The  medicus,  while  remaining  integrally  the  medicus,  becomes  also  the  medicina  utilized  
by  the  medicus.  The  presence  of  the  physician  within  the  medicine  infuses  that  medicine  
with   an   efficacious   abundance   that   truly   belongs   to   it   and   yet   simultaneously  
transcends  it.  Such  is  the  Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logical  mode  of  divine  healing.  
   Thus   far   in   this   section   I   have   presented   a   step-­‐‑by-­‐‑step   reading   of   the   first   14  
chapters  or  so  of  Book  I  of  De  doctrina.  I  have  done  so  with  a  view  to  bringing  out  the  
nuanced   flavor   of  Augustine’s   thinking   in   this  work.  Augustine   knows   that  Wisdom  
itself   is  nuanced,   touching  from  end  to  end  strongly  and  disposing  all   things  sweetly.  
And   the   connected   tasks   of   interpreting   Scripture,   understanding   and   evaluating  
realities,  and  engaging  in  the  activity  of  doctrina  demand  the  same  sense  of  subtlety—a  
subtlety   whose  mode   is,   I   contend,   Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logical.   But   what   does   this   mean   in  
actuality?   In   other   words,   how   do   we,   practically   speaking,   act   in   accord   with   this  
mode?  How  does   it  modify   the  way  we   read   this  book  called   the  Book?  How  does   it  
modify  the  way  we  understand  and  evaluate  the  realities  we  encounter?  And  how  does  
it  modify   the  way  we   educate?   Indeed,  when   such  questions   are   raised,   I   balk,   and   I  
                                                
40   “Et   quemadmodum   medici   cum   alligant   vulnera,   non   incomposite,   sed   apte   id   faciunt,   ut  
vinculi   utilitatem   quaedam   pulchritudo   etiam   consequatur;   sic   medicina   Sapientiae   per   hominis  
susceptionem   nostris   est   accomodata   vulneribus;   de   quibusdam   contrariis   curans,   et   de   quibusdam  
similibus”  (DDC,  I.14.13).  
41   “…   sapientia   Dei   hominem   curans,   seipsum   exhibuit   ad   sanandum,   ipsa   medicus,   ipsa  
medicina”  (DDC,  I.14.13).  
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begin   to   see   more   clearly   Augustine’s   claim   that   what   he   is   doing   in  De   doctrina   is  
indeed  a  magnum  opus  et  arduum,  “a  great  and  arduous  work.”  
   Now,   from   what   I   have   presented   thus   far,   there   appears   to   be   a   simple,  
straightforward  answer  to  these  questions,  namely,  measuring  all  that  we  do  in  light  of  
the  abovemost  Measure,  who  had  become  manifest  to  us  in  Christ.  This  meaure  in  us  in  
accordance  with  the  abovemost  Measure  is  charity.  For  by  charity  we  orient  our  heart  
and  mind  toward  the  Triune  God  as  the  sole  reality  to  be  enjoyed,  a  drive  toward  the  
ever-­‐‑excelling  Divinity  that  becomes  the  deepest  impetus  of  our  being,  while  “anything  
else  to  be  loved  that  comes  into  the  soul  is  seized  there  where  the  whole  impetus  of  love  
runs.”  Augustine  continues:  
Whoever,  then,  rightly  loves  his  neighbor  should  so  act  with  him  so  that  
he  may  also  love  God  with  his  whole  heart,  whole  soul,  and  whole  mind.  
For   thus   loving  him  as  himself,   he  bears  back  his  whole   love  of  himself  
and  his  neighbor   toward   that   love  of  God  which  allows  no  stream  to  be  
led   outside   away   from   itself,   by   the   diversion   of   which   it   might   be  
diminished.42  
Charity,   then,   enables   the   right   ordering   of   our   attachments   to   different   realities,  
namely,   God,   ourselves,   our   neighbors,   our   bodies,   and   everything   else   that   is.   Our  
soul’s  attachemtns  are  thus  measured  in  accordance  with  the  standing  that  each  reality  
has   as   a   reality,   and   this   internal  measure   of   the   soul   is   justice   and   holiness.   Hence  
Augsutine  says:  
                                                
42  “.  .  .  quidquid  aliud  diligendum  venerit  in  animum,  illuc  rapiatur,  quo  totus  dilectionis  impetus  
currit.  Quisquis  ergo  recte  proximum  diligit,  hoc  cum  eo  debet  agere,  ut  etiam  ipse  toto  corde,  tota  anima,  
tota  mente  diligat  Deum.  Sic  enim  eum  diligens  tanquam  seipsum,  totam  dilectionem  sui  et  illius  refert  in  
illam  dilectionem  Dei,  quae  nullum  a  se  rivulum  duci  extra  patitur,  cujus  derivatione  minuatur”  (DDC,  
I.22.21).  
Later  in  Book  III  Augustine  defines  “charity”  thus:  “Caritatem  voco  motum  animi  ad  fruendum  
Deo  propter  ipsum,  et  se  atque  proximo  propter  Deum”  (III.10.16).  [“I  call  charity  the  motion  of  the  soul  
toward  enjoying  God  on  account  of  himself  and  oneself  and  one’s  neighbor  on  account  of  God.”]  
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Now,  he  lives  justly  and  in  a  holy  way  who  is  an  integrated  evaluator  of  
things.  Such  is  the  one  who  has  an  ordered  love:  neither  does  he  love  what  
is  not   to  be   loved,  nor  does  he  not   love  what   is   to  be   loved,  nor  does  he  
love  more  what  is  to  be  loved  less,  nor  does  he  love  equally  what  is  to  be  
loved  either  more  or  less,  nor  does  he  love  more  or  less  what  is  to  be  loved  
equally.43  
Justice  and  holiness,  then,  consists  in  the  right  ordering  of  our  heart’s  attachments  to  the  
realities  it  encounters.  
   By  means  of  charity,  therefore,  the  human  heart  is  attuned  to  realities  as  they  are:  
natural  ones  are  to  be  used,  the  Uncreated—i.e.,  the  divine  Persons—are  to  be  enjoyed.  
This  attunement  does  not  diminish  or  denigrate  our  love  of  natural  realities;  rather,  in  
the  integrity  of  charity,  we  attach  ourselves  to  natural  realities  precisely  as  created,  and  
thus  we  simultaneously  bear  them  back  toward  the  triune  Creator  who  wills  them  into  
being,  who   is   the   reality   from  whom   they   came   forth   and   toward  whom   they   are   to  
return.   By   orienting   our   natural   attachments   toward   the   abovemost   God,   charity  
salvifically  anoints  them  by  a  deeper,  more  fundamental  attachment  to  the  one  reality  to  
be  enoyed,  who  is  able  to  make  us  blessed.  
   This   Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logical   structure   of   charity   should   be   present   in   all   that   we  
do—not   only   in   the   choices  we  make,   but   also   in   the  ways  we   think   about   realities.  
Intellectually  speaking,   then,  we  inculcate  charity  by  adequating  our  thinking  to  Jesus  
Christ,  the  Anointed  Who  Saves,  who  stands  front  and  center  as  the  single  reality  who  
makes  sense  of  all  other  realities.  In  De  doctrina,  therefore,  the  paradigm  of  Jesus  Christ  
is   the   key   to   engaging   in   the   three   major   tasks   with   which   the   work   is   concerned,  
                                                
43  “Ille  autem  juste  et  sancte  vivit,  qui  rerum  integer  aestimator  est:  ipse  est  autem  qui  ordinatam  
dilectionem  habet,  ne  aut  diligat  quod  non  est  diligendum,  aut  non  diligat  quod  est  dilegendum,  aut  
amplius  diligat  quod  minus  est  diligendum,  aut  aeque  diligat  quod  vel  minus  vel  amplius  diligendum  
est,  aut  minus  vel  amplius  quod  aeque  diligendum  est”  (DDC,  I.27.28).  
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namely,   interpreting   Scripture,   dealing   “ontologically”   (i.e.,   intellectually   and  
volitionally)   with   any   reality  whatsoever,   and   educating   others.   To   be   sure,   positing  
Christ   as   the  key   to   these   tasks  may   seem  a   simple  answer,   and  yet   in  positing   it  we  
must   simultaneously   acknowledge   that   Jesus   Christ   is   the  most   non-­‐‑simple—i.e.,   the  
most   complex—reality   there   can   be;   for   Christ   recapitulates   in   himself   all   realities  
arranged   hierarchically   as   well   as   the   transcendent   divine   cause   of   those   very  
hierarchically-­‐‑arranged  realities—and  he  manages  to  do  so  in  a  way  that  keeps  intact  all  
relevant  ontological  distinctions  between  them.44  
   Accordingly,   then,   the   manner   in   which   we   are   to   engage   in   these   tasks   is  
likewise   both   simple   and   complex.   The   manner   is   simple   inasmuch   as   we   should  
engage   in   these   tasks   in   the  mode  of   charity.  For   charity  as  a  disposition  of   the  heart  
helps  us  to  unlock  the  Scriptures,  to  bring  to  light  the  truth  and  value  of  every  reality,  
and  to  bring  others  to  recognize  these  same  things.  Yet  this  charity  must,  like  Wisdom,  
touch   from  end  to  end  strongly  and  dispose  sweetly,  and   it  can  do  so  only   if   it   is   the  
deepest  and  most  forceful  impetus  present  in  us  as  we  carry  out  these  tasks  while  at  the  
same  time  enabling  us  to  exercise  the  same  deft  touch  that  Christ  the  physician  does  in  
healing   us.  His   is   a   deft   touch   that   is  wisely   and   discerningly   accommodated   to   our  
wounds;   in   turn,   therefore,  ours  must  be  a  deft   touch  that  respects  and  acknowledges  
the  multiplicity,  diversity,   and  distinctions   innate   to   the  objects   of   our   tasks   (namely,  
Scripture,  all  realities,  and  other  human  souls),  and  that  also  deals  with  these  objects  so  
as  to  bring  them  gently  to  their  completion.  
   Consider,  for  example,  the  task  of  dealing  with  Scripture,  which  is  prima  facie  the  
principal  concern  of  De  doctrina.  If  one  were  to  sum  up  Augustine’s  teaching  about  the  
manner   in   which   we   should   treat   Scripture   so   as   “come   upon   the   things   to   be  
                                                
44   Ultimately,   then,   DDC   is   touching   upon   the   very   “mystery   of   God’s   will,”   namely,   the  
recapitulation  of  all  things  in  Christ.  See  Ephesians  1:9-­‐‑10.  
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understood”   in   it,   one   could   put   it   thus:   charity   must   salvifically   anoint   our  
interpretation   of   Scripture.   In   other   words,   our   encounter   with   Scripture   must   be  
human-­‐‑and-­‐‑divine   (i.e.,   “anointed”),   and   it   must   be   oriented   ultimately   toward   the  
enjoyment  of  God  by  both  ourselves  and  our  neighbor  (i.e.,  “salvific”).  What  does  this  
mean  exactly?  It  means  our  encounter  with  Scripture  must  be  human;  that  is,  we  should  
read  it  intelligently,  alertly,  and  perceptively  (and,  if  possible,  in  its  original  language),  
just   as   we   would   endeavor   to   read   any   other   book   that   we   take   seriously.   (In   this  
regard,   then,  much  of  De  doctrina   is  not  specifically  about  how  to  read  Scripture  well,  
but   more   generally   about   how   to   read   any   book   well.)   In   addition,   it   means   our  
encounter   with   Scripture   must   be   divine;   for   we   should   read   it   with   a   divine-­‐‑like  
expansiveness   and   generosity   that   allows   its   superabundant   meaningfulness   to  
manifest   itself   to  us.  Such  generous   freedom  in  reading  Scripture   is  especially  helpful  
when   we   are   alert   to   the   meaningfulness   present   in   the   “spirit”   of   transferred   and  
figurative  signs  that  permeates  the  “letter”  of  the  text.  The  literal  meaning  of  Scripture,  
in  other  words,  is  anointed  with  figurative  meaningfulness,  and  it  is  charity  that  prods  
us   gently   from   slavery   to   the   letter   toward   the   freedom   of   apprehending   that   same  
letter’s  spiritual  intelligibility.45  Finally,  our  encounter  with  Scripture  must  be  oriented  
                                                
45   Consider,   e.g.,   the   following   passage:   “Sed   verborum   translatorum   ambiguitates   .   .   .   non  
mediocrem  curam   industriamque  desiderant.  Nam   in  principio  cavendum  est  ne   figuratam   locutionem  
ad  litteram  accipias.  Et  ad  hoc  enim  pertinet  quod  ait  Apostolus:  Littera  occidit,  spiritus  autem  vivificat   [II  
Cor.  3:6].  Cum  enim  figurate  dictum  sic  accipitur,  tanquam  proprie  dictum  sit,  carnaliter  sapitur.  Neque  
ulla   mors   animae   congruentius   appellatur,   quam   cum   id   etiam   quod   in   ea   bestiis   antecellit,   hoc   est,  
intelligentia  carni  subjicitur  sequendo  litteram.  Qui  enim  sequitur  litteram,  translata  verba  sicut  propria  
tenet,  neque  illud  quod  proprio  verbo  significatur,  refert  ad  aliam  significationem”  (DDC,  III.5.9).   [“But  
the  ambiguities  of   transferred  words,  which  are  to  be  spoken  about  next,  require  no  mediocre  care  and  
diligence.  For  you  are  to  be  warned  in  the  beginning  lest  you  take  a  figurative  expression  literally.  And  
what  the  Apostle  says  pertains  to  this:  ‘The  letter  kills,  but  the  Spirit  makes  alive’  [II  Cor.  3:6].  For  when  
something  said  figuratively  is  taken  as  if  it  were  said  properly,  it  is  understood  in  a  fleshly  manner.  Nor  
is  anything  more  fittingly  called  the  death  of  the  soul  than  when  even  that  which  in  the  soul  surpasses  the  
beasts—i.e.,  the  intelligence—is  subject  to  the  flesh  by  following  the  letter.  For  he  who  follows  the  letter  
takes   transferred  words   as   proper,   nor   does   he   bear   back   that  which   is   signified   by   the   proper  word  
toward  another  signification.”]  On  this  point,  see  also  DDC,  III.9.13.  
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salvifically;   for   our   interpretation   of   Scripture   should   not   become   an   impediment   or  
snare   that  holds  us  or  others  back   from  progress   toward   the  enjoyment  of   the  Triune  
God   through   Christ.   We   should   avoid,   therefore,   taking   pride   in   our   own  
interpretations,   and  we   should  hold  back   from  excluding   interpretations   that,   even   if  
they   seem  wrongheaded   to   us,   are   nonetheless  moving   in   the   same   direction   of   that  
underlying  motion  toward  God  that  charity  itself  is.46  
   A  similar  consideration  could  be  carried  out  with  regard  to  the  task  of  education;  
for  it,  too,  should  be  undertaken  Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logically.  That  is  to  say,  education  should  
be   salvifically   anointed,   and   this   takes   place   especially—or,   perhaps,   only—when  
educators   exercise   the   activity   of   doctrina   in   the  mode   of   charity.47   Hence,   education  
should  be  human-­‐‑and-­‐‑divine,  and  it  should  be  oriented  toward  both  the  student’s  and  
the   teacher’s   beatitude.   Before   making   any   general   comments   on   this   mode   of  
                                                
46  Consider,  e.g.,  the  following  passage:  “Quando  autem  ex  eisdem  Scripturae  verbis,  non  unum  
aliquid,   sed   duo   vel   plura   sentiuntur,   etiam   si   latet   quid   senserit   ille   qui   scripsit,   nihil   periculi   est,   si  
quodlibet   eorum   congruere   veritati   ex   aliis   locis   sanctarum   Scripturarum   doceri   potest:   id   tamen   eo  
conante  qui  divina  scrutatur  eloquia,  ut  ad  voluntatem  perveniatur  auctoris,  per  quem  Scripturam  illam  
sanctus  operatus  est  Spiritus;  sive  hoc  assequatur,  sive  aliam  sententiam  de  illis  verbis,  quae  fidei  rectae  
non  refragatur,  exsculpat,  testimonium  habens  a  quocumque  alio  loco  divinorum  eloquiorum.  Ille  quippe  
auctor  in  eisdem  verbis  quae  intelligere  volumus,  et  ipsam  sententiam  forsitan  vidit;  et  certe  Dei  Spiritus,  
qui  per  eum  haec  operatus  est,   etiam   ipsam  occursuram   lectori  vel  auditori,   sine  dubitatione  praevidit;  
imo   ut   occurreret,   quia   et   ipsa   est   veritate   subnixa,   providit.   Nam   quid   in   divinis   eloquiis   largius   et  
uberius   potuit   divinitus   provideri,   quam   ut   eadem   verba   pluribus   intelligantur   modis,   quos   alia   non  
minus  divina  contestantia  faciant  approbari?”  (DDC,  III.27.38).  [“When,  however,  not  one  thing,  but  two  
or  several  are  judged  from  the  same  words  of  Scripture,  even  if  what  the  writer  judged  is  hidden,  there  is  
no  danger  if  each  of  these  can  be  taught  to  fit  with  truth  from  other  places  in  the  holy  Scriptures.  Now  the  
one  who  carefully  searches  the  divine  sayings—who  is  striving  to  be  led  to  the  will  of  the  author  through  
whom  the  Holy  Spirit  worked  that  Scripture,  whether  he  attains  this  or  some  other  judgment  about  these  
words  that  does  not  run  counter  to  right  faith—is  without  blame  when  he  has  testimony  from  any  other  
part  of  the  divine  sayings.  For  the  author  perhaps  saw  in  the  same  words  what  we  want  to  understand  
and  that  very  judgment;  and  certainly  the  Spirit  of  God,  who  worked  these  things  through  him,  without  
doubt   foresaw  the  very   thing   that  was   to  occur   to   the   reader  or  hearer—indeed,  he  provided  so   that   it  
would  occur   to  him,   since   it   is   supported  by   truth   itself.  For  what  could  be  provided  more  generously  
and  more  abundantly  in  the  divine  sayings  than  that  the  same  words  be  understood  in  several  ways  that  
other  testimonies  that  are  no  less  divine  cause  to  be  approved?”]  
47  Augustine  himself  exemplifies  this  mode  of  teaching  in  De  magistro,  where  we  see  him  at  work  
in  the  task  of  educating  his  son  Adeodatus.  
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education,  however,  it  may  be  best  to  consinder  briefly  Book  IV  of  De  doctrina,  in  which  
Augustine  articulates  a  Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logical  manner  of  learning  and  exercising  rhetoric.  
With  such  an  example  in  place,  we  will  be  in  in  a  better  position  to  treat  the  implications  
of  Book  I’s  Christianized  ontology  for  the  task  of  education.  
  
III.  Learning  and  Exercising  Rhetoric  Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logically  
   This   section’s   brief   consideration   of   Book   IV’s   discussion   of   rhetoric   both   is  
limited  in  scope  and  comes  with  an  important  presupposition.  The  limitation  is   this:   I  
touch  upon  only   a   few  aspect   of  Augustine’s  discussion  of   rhetoric  with   but   a   single  
goal   in   mind,   namely,   to   illustrate   how   it   assumes   a   Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logical   mode   in  
Augustine’s   presentation   of   it.   The   presupposition   is   this:   I   take   for   granted   that  
Augustine’s   articulation   of   the   rhetorical   categories   that   he   gathers   from   Cicero   is  
sufficiently  accurate—at  least  insofar  as  it  outlines  rhetorical  categories  that  were  likely  
operative  in  Rome’s  pagan  political  context.  
   Perhaps   the   first   thing   to   note   about   Augustine’s   discussion   of   rhetoric   is   the  
value  he  sees  in  a  Christian’s  possession  of  this  art,  which  he  points  out  early  on  in  Book  
IV  thus:  
For   since   through   the   rhetorical   art   both   true   and   false   things   may   be  
urged,  who  would  dare   to  say   that   truth   in   its  defenders  ought   to  stand  
unarmed   against   lying,   so   that   those  who   strive   to   urge   things   that   are  
false  would  know  from  the  start  how  to  make  a  hearer  either  good-­‐‑willed  
or  eager  or  teachable,  whereas  [defenders  of  truth]  would  not  know?  .   .   .  
Since,   then,   the   faculty  of  eloquence,  which  avails   in  many  ways   toward  
urging  either  depraved  or  upright  things,  is  placed  in  the  middle,  why  is  it  
not   put   together   with   the   zeal   of   good  men   so   that   they  may   fight   for  
truth,  if  evil  men  usurp  it  to  maintain  perverse  and  empty  causes  for  uses  
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of  inquity  and  error?48  
Rhetoric  or  eloquence,  then,  is  a  capacity  in  medio  posita,  “placed  in  the  middle,”  capable  
of   being   used   for   good   or   ill.   It   is,   in   other   words,   like   the   Egyptian   gold   that   the  
Egyptians  misused  but  that  the  Jews  were  able  to  purify  and  reshape  into  vessels  and  
ornaments   utilized   for   true   worship.   Augustine   was   aware,   no   doubt,   of   his   own  
usurpation  of  rhetoric  earlier  in  life,  whereby  he  likely  maintained  perverse  and  empty  
causes,  and  yet  he  is  sensible  enough  to  recognize  that  the  corruption  lay  more  deeply  
in  his  own  heart  than  in  the  principles  and  techniques  of  the  art  that  he  had  acquired.  
   Augustine   seems  wary,   however,   of   passing   this   skill   on   to   others   by   way   of  
direct  training  in  it.  He  intends  neither  in  Book  IV  nor  outside  of  it  to  engage  in  training  
rhetoricians   as   such.   He   suggests,   rather,   that   Christians   learn   by   an   “ecclesiastical  
osmosis,”   being   permeated   by   the   eloquence   present   in   good   literature   written   by  
Christians.   If  a  capable  Christian  dives   into  such  literature,  he  “imbues  this  eloquence  
by  being  near  to  it  and  especially  by  the  exercise  of  writing  out  or  dictating  and,  later,  of  
speaking  those  things  that  he  perceives  in  accordance  with  the  rule  of  piety  and  faith.”49  
This  mode  of  learning  eloquence  is  Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logical;  for  the  rhetorical  art,  embodied  
in  ecclesiastical  works  of  human  origin,   is  acquired  by   the   reader  of   these  works   in  a  
context  permeated  by  piety  toward  and  faith   in  God,  which  orient  the  art  so  acquired  
toward   saving   both   others   and   himself   by   the   effective   preaching   of   the   Gospel.   In  
                                                
48   “Nam   cum   per   artem   rhetoricam   et   vera   suadeantur   et   falsa,   quis   audeat   dicere,   adversus  
mendacium   in   defensoribus   suis   inarmem   debere   consistere   veritatem,   ut   videlicet   illi   qui   res   falsas  
persuadere  conantur,  noverint  auditorem  vel  benevolum,  vel   intentum,  vel  docilem  proemio  facere,   isti  
autem  non  noverint?  …  Cum  ergo  sit   in  medio  posita   facultas  eloquii,  quae  ad  persuadenda  seu  prava  
seu   recta   valet   plurimum:   cur   non   bonorum   studio   comparatur,   ut   militet   veritati,   si   eam   mali   ad  
obtinendas  perversas  vanasque  causas  in  usus  iniquitatis  et  erroris  usurpant?”  (DDC,  IV.2.2).  
49   “Quoniam   si   acutum   et   fervens   adsit   in   genium,   facilius   adhaeret   eloquentia   legentibus   et  
audientibus  eloquentes,  quam  eloquentiae  praecepta  sectantibus.  Nec  desunt  ecclesiasticae  litterae,  etiam  
praeter  canonem  in  auctoritatis  arce  salubriter  collocatum,  quas  legendo  homo  capax,  etsi  id  non  agat,  sed  
tantummodo   rebus   quae   ibi   dicuntur   intentus   sit,   etiam   eloquio   quo   dicuntur,   dum   in   his   versatur,  
imbuitur,  accedente  vel  maxime  exercitatione  sive  scribendi  sive  dictandi,  postremo  etiam  dicendi,  quae  
secundum  pietatis  ac  fidei  regulam  sentit”  (DDC,  IV.3.4).  
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contrast,   the   Christian’s   acquisition   of   rhetoric   in   a   pagan   manner,   i.e.,   by   focused  
training   in   the   skill   itself,  would   separate   this  human   skill   from   the  divine   context   in  
which   its   true   utility   is   revealed.  At   best   the   skill   so   acquired  would   stand   in  medio,  
neither  hot  nor  cold.  Now  a  Christian,  Augustine  spits  out  such  lukewarm,  unanointed,  
non-­‐‑salvifically-­‐‑oriented   rhetoric,   and   he   shows   no   interest   in   training   others   in   this  
“secularized”  mode.  
   It   appears,   moreover,   that   the   acquisition   of   rhetoric   by   ecclesiastical   osmosis  
tallies  better  with  the  manner  in  which  eloquence  is  present  in  Scripture  itself,  or  at  least  
in   those   passages   that   even   the   experts  would   recognize   as   rhetorically   excellent.  As  
Augustine  puts  it:  
In  those  places  [in  Scripture]   in  which  [eloquence]   is  perhaps  recognized  
by  the  learned,  such  realities  are  spoken  that  the  words  by  which  they  are  
spoken  seem  not   to  be  employed  by  the  one  saying  them,  but  seem  as   if  
they  are  freely  subject  to  the  realities  themselves—as  though  you  were  to  
understand  that  wisdom  goes  forth  from  her  house,  i.e.,  from  the  breast  of  
the  wise  man,  and  eloquence   follows  as  an   inseparable   servant  who  has  
not  even  been  called.50  
Just  as  the  reader  of  ecclesiastical  literature  concerns  himself  primarily  with  what  can  be  
learned   from   it   about   divine   matters   and   yet   concomitantly   assimilates   the   rhetoric  
contained   therein,   so   Scripture   primarily   communicates  wisdom   and   yet   does   so      in  
speech   that   is   unaffectedly   eloquent.   Scripture,   then,   is   the   embodiment   of   divine  
wisdom  in  human  speech—human  speech  that  is  at  times  ordinary,  at  times  eloquent.  
Augustine  expresses   this  point  concisely.  “These   [Scriptures],”  he  says,  “were  not  put  
                                                
50  “Et  in  quibus  forte  locis  agnoscitur  a  doctis,  tales  res  dicuntur,  ut  verba  quibus  dicuntur,  non  a  
dicente  adhibita,  sed  ipsis  rebus  velut  sponte  subjuncta  videantur:  quasi  sapientiam  de  domo  sua,  id  est,  
pectore   sapientis   procedere   intelligas,   et   tanquam   inseparabilem   famulam   etiam   non   vocatam   sequi  
eloquentiam”  (DDC,  IV.6.10).  
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together  by  human  industry,  but  were  poured  out  by  the  divine  mind  both  wisely  and  
eloquently—not  with  wisdom  intent  upon  eloquence,  but  with  eloquence  not  receding  
from  wisdom.”51   In   Scripture,  wisdom  assumes  human   speech   to   itself,  which   speech  
can  be  quite  eloquent;  in  Scripture,  in  other  words,  human  speech  is  anointed  by  divine  
wisdom,  and  this  anointing  is  eminently  useful  for  our  reaching  beatitude.  Such  is  the  
Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logical  mode  of  Scripture’s  speech  itself.  
   Let   us   turn   briefly   now   to   the   Christian   rhetorician.   How   might   a   Christian  
possess  and  exercise  rhetoric  in  a  Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logical  manner?  It  may  be  best  to  begin  
answering   this  question  by  considering  aspects  of   the  unpurified  gold   that  Augustine  
appropriates  from  Cicero.  According  to  Augustine  in  Book  IV,  the  great  Roman  orator  
distinguished   three   rhetorical   styles,   namely,   the   understated,   the   balanced,   and   the  
grand.  In  addition,  Cicero  matches  each  style  with  a  distinct  activity  in  which  an  orator  
may   be   engaged,   namely,   teaching   his   hearers,   delighting   them,   or   bending   them,  
respectively.   And   finally,   these   styles   and   activities   correspond   with   the   different  
“magnitudes”   of   the   subjects   of   which   an   orator   may   speak,   namely,   small   things,  
moderate   things,   and  great   things,   respectively.  Gathering   these  distinctions   together,  
Augustine  expresses  his  understanding  of  Cicero’s  teaching  thus:  “He  will  be  eloquent,  
therefore,  who  will  be  able   to  say  small   things   in  an  understated  way  so   that  he  may  
teach,  moderate  things  in  a  balanced  way  so  that  he  may  delight,  and  great  things  in  a  
grand  way  so  that  he  may  bend.”52  Certainly  Augustine  recognizes  how  prudent  these  
                                                
51   “Neque   enim   haec   humana   industria   composita,   sed   divina  mente   sunt   fusa   et   sapienter   et  
eloquenter;   non   intenta   in   eloquentiam   sapientia,   sed   a   sapientia   non   recedente   eloquentia”   (DDC,  
IV.7.21).  
52  “Qui  ergo  nititur  dicendo  persuadere  quod  bonum  est,  nihil  illorum  trium  spernens—ut  scilicet  
doceat,  ut  delectet,  ut   flectat—oret  atque  agat  ut,  quemadmodum  supra  diximus,   intellegenter,   libenter,  
oboedienterque  audiatur.  Quod  cum  apte   et   convenienter   facit,  non   immerito   eloquens  dici  potest,   etsi  
non  eum  sequatur  auditoris  assensus.  Ad  haec  enim  tria,  id  est  ut  doceat,  ut  delectet,  ut  flectat,  etiam  illa  
tria  videtur  pertinere  voluisse  idem  ipse  Romani  auctor  eloquii,  cum  itidem  dixit:  Is  erit  igitur  eloquens,  qui  
poterit   parva   summisse,   modica   temperate,   magna   granditer   dicere   [cf.   Cicero,   Orator,   I.101],   tamquam   si  
adderet  illa  etiam  tria,  et  sic  explicaret  unam  eamdemque  sententiam,  dicens:  Is  erit  igitur  eloquens,  qui  
Matthew  D.  WALZ        
  
ARTS  OF  LIBERTY  1:1                                                     SUMMER  2013  
 
91
prescriptions   were   in   Cicero’s   pagan   political   context.   Indeed,   perhaps   Augustine  
experienced   in  his  own  work  as  an  orator   the  prudence  of   these  distinctions.  And  no  
doubt  we  ourselves   can   recognize   the  absurdity  of   a  professor’s   entering  a   classroom  
and   launching   into   a   grand   speech.   And   no   doubt   a   politician   is   aware   that   being  
understated  simply  does  not  work  well  at  a  rally  of  thousands  just  days  before  a  close  
election.   In   short,   then,   Cicero’s   distinctions   and   correspondences   seem   to   make  
eminent  sense.  
   Is   it   possible,   then,   that   Augustine   has   a   problem  with   these   distinctions   and  
correspondences,  which  are  so  sensible?  The  answer,  I  believe,   is  both  affirmative  and  
negative.   For   appears   not   to   have   a   problem  with   Cicero’s   teaching   inasmuch   as   he  
never  denies   the  validity  of  distinguishing   these   styles   and  connecting   them  with   the  
activities   with   which   Cicero   connects   them.   Indeed,   he   even   quotes   at   length   both  
Scriptural  passages  and  passages  from  ecclesiastical  authors  in  order  to  illustrate  these  
very   distinctions.   And   yet   there   is   at   least   one   notable   wrinkle   that   appears   in  
Augustine’s  appropriation  of  Cicero’s  teaching.  It  has  to  do  with  the  magnitude  of  the  
things   of   which   an   orator   speaks,   to   which   Augustine   calls   our   attention   in   the  
following  passage:  
In   our   case,   however,   since  we   ought   to   bear   back   all   things,   especially  
things   we   say   to   people   from   a   superior   position,   to   the   salvation   of  
men—not   temporal,   but   eternal—while   eternal   ruin   is   to   be   avoided,   all  
the   things  we  say  are  great,   even   to   the  point   that  what  an  ecclesiastical  
teacher  says  about  monetary  things,  whether  they  are  to  be  acquired  or  let  
go,  ought  not  to  be  seen  as  small,  no  matter  if  the  money  is  great  or  small.  
For  justice,  which  we  ought  to  guard  even  in  the  case  of  a  small  amount  of  
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money,   is  not   small,   as  when   the  Lord  says,   “The  one  who   is   faithful   in  
what   is   least   is   faithful  also   in  what   is  great”  [Luke  16:10].  What   is   least,  
then,   is   least;   but   to   be   faithful   in  what   is   least   is   great.   For   just   as   the  
notion   of   roundness—i.e.,   that   from   a   middle   point   all   equal   lines   are  
drawn  to  their  endpoints—is  the  same  in  a  great  dish  as  in  a  meager  coin,  
so  also  when  small  things  are  carried  out  justly,  the  greatness  of  justice  is  
not  diminished.53  
Apparently,   then,   Cicero   and  Augustine   do   not  measure   by   the   same  measure   those  
matters  of  which  an  orator  speaks.  
   Broadly  speaking,  Cicero  measures  by  a  temporal  measure,  which  is  fitting  in  a  
pagan  political  community  that  has  its  eyes  set  primarily  on  the  relative  value  of  things  
as   they   pertain   to   success   or   even   virtue   in   this   life.   Augustine,   on   the   other   hand,  
measures  by  an  eternal  measure,  one  that  recognizes  how  even  the  smallest  of  human  
activities  could  be  anointed  by  fidelity   to  God  in  a  manner   that  would  place   its  value  
beyond   the  measures  of   this   temporal  dispensation.  No  matter  how  big  or   small   that  
activity  may  be  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  the  notion  or  form  (ratio)  of  fidelity  is  able  to  be  
just   as  present   in   its   full   strength,   just   as   roundness   is  present   in   a   small   coin   just   as  
much  as  in  a  large  plate  or,  for  that  matter,  the  moon.  When  exercising  their  eloquence,  
then,   Christians   employ   different  measures   than   do   the  worldly.   Augustine   captures  
well  these  different  measures  thus:  
                                                
53  “In  istis  autem  nostris,  quandoquidem  omnia,  maxime  quae  de  loco  superiore  populis  dicimus,  
ad  hominum  salutem,  nec  temporariam,  sed  aeternam  referre  debemus,  ubi  etiam  cavendus  est  aeternus  
interitus,  omnia  magna  sunt  quae  dicimus;  usque  adeo  ut  nec  de  ipsis  pecuniariis  rebus  vel  acquirendis  
vel   amittendis   parva   videri   debeant,   quae   doctor   ecclesiasticus   dicit,   sive   sit   illa   magna,   sive   parva  
pecunia.  Neque   enim  parva   est   justitia,   quam  profecto   et   in  parva  pecunia   custodire  debemus,  dicente  
Domino:  Qui  in  minimo  fidelis  est,  et  in  magno  fidelis  est  [Luke  16:10].  Quod  ergo  minimum  est,  minimum  
est:  sed  in  minimo  fidelem  esse,  magnum  est.  Nam  sicut  ratio  rotunditatis,  id  est  a  puncto  medio  omnes  
lineae  pares  in  extrema  ducantur,  eadem  est  in  magno  disco,  quae  in  nummolo  exiguo;  ita  ubi  parva  juste  
geruntur,  non  minuitur  justitiae  magnitude”  (DDC,  IV.18.35).  
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Of  course,  if  we  were  to  advise  men  as  to  the  manner  in  which  they  ought  
to  deal  with  secular  affairs  on  behalf  of  either  themselves  or  their  own  in  
the  presence  ecclesiastical   judges,  we  would   rightly  admonish   them   that  
they  deal  with  them  understatedly  as  small  things.  Since,  however,  we  are  
discussing   the   eloquence  of   that  man  whom  we  want   to   be   a   teacher   of  
those   realities   by   which   we   are   freed   from   eternal   evils   and   arrive   at  
eternal  goods,  wherever  they  are  dealt  with  .  .  .  they  are  great.54  
The   eternal  measure  with  which   the   Christian  measures   entails,   then,   a   rhetoric   that  
expresses   an   ascetic   detachment   from   the   goods   of   this   world   coupled  with   hopeful  
attachment  to  beatitude  with  God.  
   As   I   noted   above,   though,   we   must   recognize   that   Augustine   does   not  
obliterating  or  overrun  the  distinctions  and  correspondences  that  he  appropriates  from  
Cicero;  on  the  contrary,  recognizing  their  limitations,  he  nonetheless  promotes  what  he  
has   gathered   from   him   by   highlighting   the   presence   of   Cicero’s   teaching   in   both  
Scripture   and   ecclesiastical   literature.   In   sum,   Augustine   salvifically   anoints   Cicero’s  
human  rhetorical  categories  with  charity,  so  that  Cicero’s  teaching  may  be  employed  by  
the  Christian  who  has   a   fundamental   concern   for   eternal   goods   for   both   himself   and  
others.  Hence  the  truly  Christian  orator  is  able  to  discern  not  merely  how  to  display  his  
own   skills   to   his   own  benefit   (which  Cicero  himself  would  have   abhorred),   nor   even  
how  to  employ  his  skills  in  order  to  promote  the  good  of  a  political  community  (which  
Cicero  himself  attempted),  but  ultimately  how  to  deploy  eloquence  fittingly  in  relation  
to   the   particular   needs   of   his   listeners’   souls,   each   of  whom   is   voyaging   back   to   the  
fatherland.  In  this  way,  then,  the  Christian  orator  will  exercise  his  skill  in  a  Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑
                                                
54   “Sane   si  moneremus  homines  quemadmodum   ipsa  negotia   saecularia  vel  pro   se  vel  pro   suis  
apud   ecclesiasticos   iudices   agere   deberent,   recte   admoneremus   ut   agerent   tamquam   parva   summisse.  
Cum  vero  de  illius  viri  disseramus  eloquio,  quem  volumus  earum  rerum  esse  doctorem  quibus  liberamur  
ab  aeternis  malis  atque  ad  aeterna  pervenimus  bona;  ubicumque  agantur  haec,   .   .   .  magna  sunt”  (DDC,  
IV.18.37). 
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IV.  Concluding  Thoughts  
   In   Augustine’s   works,   and   in   De   doctrina   in   particular,   we   are   privileged   to  
witness  a  converted  man  who  is  willing  to  rethink  reality  and  all  of  its  facets  in  light  of  
his  assent   to   the  becoming-­‐‑flesh  of  Wisdom  itself   for   the  salvation  of  human  souls.   In  
Jesus  Christ,  the  Anointed  Who  Saves,  Augustine  recognizes  the  God-­‐‑man  in  whom  are  
hidden  all  the  treasures  of  wisdom  and  knowledge,  and  Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logic  thinking  on  
our   part   unlocks   this   treasure-­‐‑chest.   Thinking   Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logically,   in   other   words,  
brings  to  light  the  new  modes  and  orders  of  reality  revealed  in  Christianity,  which  does  
not  destroy  or  diminish  the  old  modes  and  orders,  but  rather  builds  on  and  completes  
them,   thereby   bringing   them   to   their   full   stature.   As   in   all   growth   toward  maturity,  
however,   there   is   resistance   and   tension—growing  pains,   as   it  were.   This   is   not   only  
because  what   is   being   built   on   and   completed   is   ill   and   in   need   of   healing,   but   also  
simply   because   something   created   and   finite   is   being   utilized   as   a   vessel   for   the  
Uncreated  and  Infinite.  To  be  sure,  Christ  has  bridged  this  chasm  between  the  created  
and  Uncreated,  and  yet  our  crossing  it  intellectually  and  volitionally  still  has  its  share  of  
difficulty.   The   transitus   ever   involves   a   dialectical   way   of   thinking   whereby   we   do  
justice  to  both  the  finite  measure  of  the  created  and  the  unmeasuredness  of  the  creative  
Measure.  Augustine  is  often  misunderstood  when  one  reads  him  as  picking  one  side  or  
the  other,  when  in  fact  he  is  doing  Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logical  justice  to  both.  
   Unsurprisingly,   then,   there   is   tension   in   Augustine’s   attempt   to   modify  
education   in  De   doctrina.   One  way   to   understand   this  modification   is   to   see   it   as   the  
transformation  of  education  into  a  process  that  promotes  virtue  in  the  full  Augustinian  
sense  of  the  word,  i.e.,  that  promotes  the  fulfillment  of  natural  human  capacities  in  such  
a  way  that  all  their  activity  is  enabled  by  charity  to  be  borne  back  through  Jesus  Christ  
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toward  the  abovemost  Triune  God.  In  order  both  to  understand  this  modification  and  to  
make   it  applicable   in  our  own  day,   it  may  be  helpful   to  conclude   these   reflections  on  
Augustine’s  De   doctrina   by   considering  Christian   liberal   education   as   a   “virtuous”   or  
excellent  mean  between  two  possible  “vicious”  extremes.  As  Aristotle  knew,  achieving  
and  observing  a  virtuous  mean  is  difficult  and  rare,  and  often  we  understand  it  best  by  
a  sort  of  via  negativa,  i.e.,  by  seeing  what  is  lacking  in  the  vicious  extremes  and  how  they  
fall  short  of  paradigmatic  excellence.  When  it  comes  to  Christian  liberal  education,  then,  
one  extreme  may  be   called  “fundamentalist”   education;   the  other,   “secularist.”  Allow  
me  briefly   to  depict   these  modes  of   education   rather   starkly—although  hopefully  not  
too   unrealistically—in   order   to   locate   the   proper   ever-­‐‑excelling   character   of   a   truly  
Christianized  liberal  education.  
   Fundamentalist   education   fails   to   respect   the   manifold   distinctions   within   the  
natural   and   human   dimensions   of   reality,   insofar   as   it   indelicately   bathes   all   that   is  
taught   with   a   clear-­‐‑cut,   didactic   “Biblical”   message,   one   often   rooted   directly   in  
apparently   self-­‐‑evident   Scriptural   categories.   Compared   to   an   education   in   the   Jesu-­‐‑
Christo-­‐‑logical   mode,   fundamentalist   education   is   void   of   anything   substantial   to  
anoint.   It   is   Docetistic   education,   i.e.,   a   disembodied,   ostensibly   divine   education  
permeated  with   an   in-­‐‑your-­‐‑face   salvific   drive.   Such   education   is   often   rooted   in   fear-­‐‑
based  anger  in  the  face  of  a  secularized  world,  and  it  attempts  to  take  shortcuts  in  trying  
to  Christianize  students.  It  is  underlyingly  irascible.  
   Secularist   education   operates   from   the   diminishment   and   perhaps   even   the  
denial  of  that  transcendent  Wisdom  that  touches  from  end  to  end  strongly  and  disposes  
all  things  sweetly.  Thereby  it  eliminates  the  subtle  flavor  (sapor)  of  liberal  education  that  
can   draw   us   toward   becoming   tasters   (sapientes)   of   Wisdom   (Sapientia).   Unlike  
fundamentalist   education,   secularist   education   respects   in   its   way   the   manifold  
distinctions   within   the   natural   and   human   dimensions   of   reality.   What   it   lacks,  
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however,  is  the  organic  unity  of  those  dimensions  insofar  as  their  principle  of  integrity  
and  finality,  Wisdom  itself,  is  rejected  from  the  start.  Such  education  is  not  salvific,  nor  
does  it  aim  to  be.  Absent  Wisdom  as  a  final  principle,  it  tends  to  multiply  distinctions  
within   the  natural   and  human  dimensions   according   to   the  preferences   of   those  who  
provide  and  consume  what  is  taught.  Secularist  education  is  historical-­‐‑Jesus  education,  
i.e.,  an  education  that  has  been  stripped  of  the  anointing  of  the  Divine  and  thus  has  lost  
its  integrity  and  bearings;  instead,  it  caters  simply  to  the  desires  of  those  involved  in  it.  
It  is  underlyingly  concupiscible.  
   It  would  be   foolish  of  me,  of  course,   to  attempt   to  paint  a   full  and  determinate  
picture  of  Christianized  or  Jesu-­‐‑Christo-­‐‑logical  liberal  education.  At  best  I  can  sketch  a  
rough  outline  of  it  as  a  viruous  mean  in  contrast  to  the  vicious  extremes  just  articulated.  
Truly   Christianized   education   respects—indeed,   even   celebrates—the   distinctions  
within  the  natural  and  human  dimensions  of  reality  while  at  the  same  time  not  resting  
in   their   limitedness,   but   rather   seeing   that   limitedness   as   a   reason   to   strive   further.  
Christianized   liberal   education   is   informed,   therefore,   by   a   trajectory   toward   that  
Wisdom  which   touches   from   end   to   end   strongly,   and   hence   it   embraces   all   that   the  
various   sciences   and   disciplines   do   in   order   to   bring   such  Wisdom   to   light.   But   this  
same  Wisdom  disposes  all  things  sweetly,  and  so  a  Christianized  liberal  education  must  
perceptively  discover  in  its  study  of  natural  and  human  realities  those  aspects  that  can  
signify   to   both   teacher   and   learners   the   attractive   beauty   of   the   becoming-­‐‑flesh   of  
Wisdom  itself,  who  himself  alone  is  the  via  toward  enjoyment  of  the  Wisdom  that  he  is.  
In   short,   a  Christianized   liberal   education   is   sacramental   in   character,   i.e.,   salvifically  
anointed  by  Wisdom  itself   in  a  way  that  can  lead  those  well-­‐‑disposed  by  faith  toward  
beatitude.  It  is  underlyingly  rational,  but  with  a  reason  measured  by  the  divine  Reason,  
the  Logos,  who  became  flesh  in  order  to  lead  us  to  our  patria.  
   Institutionally  speaking,  for  such  an  education  to  become  actual  would  require,  it  
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seems,   teachers   and   administrators   possessed   of   a   Sapiential   touch,   capable   of  
providing   the   real   and   natural   nourishment   of   the   arts   and   sciences   while  
simultaneoulsly  flavoring  them  with  the  subtle  savor  of  Wisdom.  Such  liberal  education  
is,  of  course,  no  small  or  easy  task,  and  so  it  goes  without  saying  that  to  the  degree  that  
it  is  accomplished  institutionally  would  be  owing  to  the  liberal  emanation  of  grace  from  
our  liberal  Father  of  Lights.  
  
  
  
